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I INTRODUCTION - Convergence and confus ion  
"Without doubt  one of t he  o l d e s t  n o t i o n s  of Western C i v i l i z a t i o n  
was t h a t  j u s t  a s  e a r t h l y  imper i a l  l awgivers  enac ted  codes of 
p o s i t i v e  law to  be obeyed by men, so  a l s o  t h e  c e l e s t i a l  and 
supreme r a t i o n a l  c r e a t o r  d e i t y  had l a i d  down a  s e r i e s  of laws 
which must be obeyed by m i n e r a l s ,  c r y s t a l s ,  p l a n t s ,  an imals ,  
and t h e  s t a r s  i n  t h e i r  cou r se s .  I I ( ~ )  
I n  an e s s a y  from which t h e  above q u o t a t i o n  i s  t aken ,  Joseph Needham 
has shown how even t o  h i s  b r ead th  of  l e a r n i n g ,  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  r o o t s  of 
t he  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between s c i e n c e  and law a r e  t ang led  and obscure .  The 
terms,  " n a t u r a l  law" and "pos i t iv i sm"  a r e  common cu r r ency  i n  bo th  f i e l d s ,  
i n d i c a t i n g  as does Needham, some impor t an t  conf luence  and i n t e r a c t i o n  on 
t h e  p a s t  - indeed law has modelled i t s e l f  a s  'moral s c i e n c e 1 .  Yet j u s t  
as t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  dimensions of t h a t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a r e  obscu re ,  s o  too a r e  
i t s  contemporary ones .  As one academic lawyer r a t h e r  c o l o u r f u l l y  p u t  it  : 
"The a n v i l  of t he  law has always resounded t o  t h e  s t r i k i n g  i r o n  
of s c i e n c e .  Some tough me ta l  has  been bea t en  o u t  t h e r e ,  sometimes 
i n t o  c u r i o u s  shapes ,  and few members of  t h e  populace  can  have 
f a i l e d  t o  h e a r  t h e  r e v e r b e r a t i n g  blows o r  t o  s e e  t h e  cascading  
sparks  which f l y  from those  impacts .  Desp i t e  a l l  t h i s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  
m i s t  of u n c e r t a i n t y ,  an o b s c u r a t i o n  of  t e rms ,  a  l a ck  of  s h a r p  
d e f i n i t i o n  which tend t o  i n v e s t  v i t a l  a s p e c t s  of  law-science 
c o r r e l a t i o n s  w i th  a  c u r i o u s  mystery.  I I ( ~ )  
This  o b s c u r i t y  i s  mainly due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  room f o r  detached 
a n a l y s i s  and d i s c u s s i o n  has  been l a r g e l y  f i l l e d  i n s t e a d  by l i t t l e  more than  
apo log ia  and polemics from the  committed. Lawyers t end  t o  e l a b o r a t e  v a r i a t i o n s  
on  t h e  theme expressed  by one judge(3),  t h a t  " t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  k inds  of  l i a r  : 
comon  l i a r s ,  damned l i a r s  and s c i e n t i f i c  exper t s" ;  o r  they  bemoan t h e  
t y p i c a l  s c i e n t i s t ' s  l a c k  of p r e c i s i o n  and c l a r i t y .  S c i e n t i s t s  o n  t h e  o t h e r  
hand tend t o  c o n t r a s t  "Truth o r  Powert1 - "Science i s  a  problem-solving 
s u b c u l t u r e  whose main v a l u e  i s  t ru th" ;  t h e  e t h i c  of  law on  t h e  o t h e r  hand 
"is t o  win c a s e s  r a t h e r  than  t o  s o l v e  problems. The lawyer ' s  "problem" i s  
n o t  t o  produce t e s t a b l e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  b u t  t o  win t h e  case". ( 4 )  The 
s c i e n t i s t s  tend t o  s e e  law on ly  a s  a  c o r r u p t i o n  of t r u t h  s i n c e ,  l i k e  base  
p o l i t i c s ,  i n  t h e i r  v'iew, i ts  o n l y  concern i s  conquest .  
Roger Smith has examined 19th cen tu ry  i n t e r a c t i o n s  between medical  
e x p e r t i s e  and t h e  c o u r t s  v i a  t he  i n s a n i t y  de fence  p l e a  i n  murder t r i a l s  
and has shown how t h e s e  l o c a l  t ens ions  r e f l e c t  impor t an t  under ly ing  
con£ l i c t s  of a  b roader  kind"). These con£ l i c t s  and dilemmas u l t i m a t e l y  
focus upon q u e s t i o n s  about  proper  modes of e x p r e s s i o n  of s o c i a l  va lues  and 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s  of s o c i a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  y e t  obscured  by t h e  r h e t o r i c ,  they 
remain unexamined, l e t  a lone  r e so lved .  Thus one of  t h e  few books devoted 
to  the  t o p i c  has  i t s  i n t r o d u c t i o n  e n t i t l e d  " t h e  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  coopera te t '  
(of s c i e n t i s t s  and l awyer s ) ,  y e t  t h e  whole book f o c u s s e s  on  "the reasons  
why s c i e n t i s t s  and lawyers  c a n ' t  t a l k  t o  each o the r "  (6),, a s  s een  by each 
s i d e .  
I n  modern t imes  we have seen  a  t r e n d  towards more and more i n t e n s i v e  
i n t e r a c t i o n  between s c i e n c e  and l e g a l  p r o c e s s e s ,  on s e v e r a l  f r o n t s  : 
( i )  The r e c e n t  f u s s  o v e r  p sycho log ica l  ev idence  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n  
t h e  Yorkshi re  Ripper c a s e  i n  t he  UK, and t h e  John Hinckley c a s e  
i n  t h e  US, i n d i c a t e s  how s t r o n g l y  t h i s  a r e a  of  i n t e r a c t i o n  con t inues ,  
and how confused and c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i t  remains.  There a r e  a l s o  o t h e r  
c r i m i n a l  c a s e s  where t h e  v a l i d i t y  and meaning o f  s c i e n t i f i c  evidence 
has  been a  p o i n t  o f  more than  irmnediate con t rove r sy  t o  t h e  c a s e  i n  
q u e s t i o n ,  f o r  example t hose  i nvo lv ing  t h e  Home O f f i c e  f o r e n s i c  e x p e r t  
who was r e c e n t l y  a l l e g e d  on  s e v e r a l  occas ions  to have f a l s i f i e d  
ev idence  which was c r i t i c a l  i n  c o n v i c t i n g  people  charged wi th  murder. 
( i i )  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  c r i m i n a l  c a s e s  which invo lve  c o n f l i c t i n g  s c i e n t i f i c  
p e r s p e c t i v e s  and which r a i s e  wider  s o c i a l  i s s u e s ,  t h e r e  a r e  an 
i n c r e a s i n g  number of  c i v i l  c a se s  which, a l t hough  fo rma l ly  couched i n  
terms of  t r a d i t i o n a l  i n d i v i d u a l i s e d  l i t i g a t i o n ,  i n  r e a l i t y  exp re s s  
a  c o n f l i c t  o f  w ide r  s o c i a l  dimensions.  Thus f o r  example t h e  a t t empt  
by two f a m i l i e s  n e a r  a  busy road junc t ion  i n  London t o  s u e  Assoc ia ted  
Oc te l  which p u t s  l e a d  i n  p e t r o l ,  f o r  h e a l t h  damage to t h e i r  c h i l d r e n  
drew i n  c o n f l i c t i n g  s c i e n t i f i c  evidence t o  be r e s o l v e d  i n  a  l e g a l  
s e t t i n g ,  y e t  was c l e a r l y  a  c o n f l i c t  o v e r  government p o l i c y  on t h e  
a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of  l e a d  i n  p e t r o l .  Likewise t h e  l e g a l  s u i t s  o v e r  t h e  
a l l e g e d  damage caused by the  drug  Debendox c a r r y  a  g e n e r a l  s o c i a l  
c o n f l i c t  o v e r  drug s a f e t y  t e s t i n g  and s t a n d a r d s ,  i n  t h e  medium of 
fo rmal  l i t i g a t i o n  between i n d i v i d u a l  p a r t i e s .  
Even i n  t h e  UK, where t h e  s cope  of  j u d i c i a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  on m a t t e r s  
t h a t  migh t  impinge on p o l i c y  has  been much more r e s t r i c t e d  than  i n  
t h e  US, t h e s e  t r e n d s  towards l e g a l  c h a n n e l l i n g  of  p o l i c y  r e l a t e d  
c o n f l i c t s  appea r  t o  be growing. The e lement  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  c o n f l i c t  as 
a  c r u x  of  t h e  i s s u e  a l s o  seems t o  be growing i n  prominence. The 
S o l i c i t o r  t o  t h e  Supreme Cour t  o f  Sco t l and  has  obse rved  t h a t  " t h e r e  
is  no doubt  t h a t  t h e  p a r t  p layed  by s c i e n t i f i c  ev i dence  i n  o u r  c o u r t s  
is  i n c r e a s i n g .  T h i s  f a c t  t ends  t o  emphasise  t h e  problems which 
ll(7) s u r round  t h e  g i v i n g  of  e x p e r t  ev idence .  
( i i i )  Th i s  tendency towards g r e a t e r  f ocus  on  s c i e n t i f i c  c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e  
c o u r t s  has  been complemented by a  p a r a l l e l  development i n  q u a s i - l e g a l  
s e t t i n g s  s u c h  a s  ( p r o s p e c t i v e )  p u b l i c  i n q u i r i e s  i n t o  developments 
s uch  a s  power s t a t i o n s ,  mining,  motorways and ga s  t e r m i n a l s ;  and 
( r e t r o s p e c t i v e )  t r i b u n a l s  of i n q u i r y  i n t o  d i s a s t e r s  such  a s  Sea Gem, 
F l ixborough ,  S u m e r l a n d s  and Bantry  Bay. Such i n q u i r i e s  have i n t e n s i f i e d  
i n  b r o a d e r  s o c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  i n  s c i e n t i f i c  c o n t e n t ,  and i n  l e g a l  
f o r m a l i t y ,  d e s p i t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a t t e m p t s  t o  r e v e r s e  t h i s .  Even ikn 
r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  i n q u i r i e s ,  such  as  t h a t  i n t o  t h e  Br i gh t on  Marina,  
e l a b o r a t e ,  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  p r e t e n t i o u s ,  quasi -Newtonian g r a v i t y  models 
o f  shopping  p a t t e r n s  have  become an a l m s t  o b l i g a t o r y ,  r i t u a l  
c u r r e n c y  o f  a u t h o r i t y .  I n  b o t h  fo rmal  c o u r t  c a s e s  and p u b l i c  i n q u i r i e s  
t h e  v e r y  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  i s s u e  now b e a r s  d i r e c t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  beyond a  
p a i r  o f  opposed p r i v a t e  p a r t i e s  means t h a t  rnore emphasis ha s  t o  be  
p l aced  upon " g e t t i n g  t h e  f a c t s  r i g h t " .  When t h e  j u d i c i a l  f u n c t i o n  
was o n l y  t o  r e s o l v e  p r i v a t e  c o n f l i c t s ,  i n  t h e  w r d s  o f  a n  American 
judge " a l t hough  i t  was a s  w e l l  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  d i s p u t e s  s h o u l d  be  
f a i r l y  s e t t l e d ,  t h e r e  was comfor t  i n  t h e  thought  t h a t  t h e  consequences 
o f  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  should  be  con f i ned  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  invo lved"  . . . 
"a c a s u a l  a t t i t u d e "  was t hus  adopted towards f a c t f i n d i n g .  I f  t h i s  
e v e r  was j u s t i f i e d ,  i t  has  l a r g e l y  d i s appea red  i n  t h e  modern e r a ,  
where widespread  l i t i g a t i o n  of p o l i c y  i s s u e s  w i t h  g e n e r a l  s o c i a l  
consequences  "demands a  more v i s i b l y  r e l i a b l e  and c r e d i b l e  p rocedure  
f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  f a c t  e lements  i n  t h e  l i t i g a t i o n " .  (8) 
As e x p e r t  c o n f l i c t s  regarded a s  c r u c i a l  t o  a  whole range  of  p o l i c y  
i s s u e s  have become i n c r e a s i n g l y  impor tan t  and i n c r e a s i n g l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
r e s o l v e ,  a t t emp t s  have been made t o  c o n t r o l  e x p e r t  d e b a t e  by f o r m a l i s i n g  
i t ,  on t h e  assumption t h a t  c o n f l i c t  was r e a l l y  due t o  t h e  l a c k  of  formal  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  much s c i e n t i f i c  deba t e .  S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  t h e  model of c o n t r o l  
t o  which people  have t u rned  has  been t h a t  o f  law, w i t h  i t s  wel l -en t renched  
and o f t e n  e l a b o r a t e  r u l e s  o f  s t a n d i n g ,  ev idence  and procedure.  Thus t h e r e  
( 9 )  has  grown a  s i g n i f i c a n t  movement on beha l f  o f  s o - c a l l e d  "Science Courts l l  , 
which a r e  supposed t o  r e s o l v e  s u c h  p o l i c y - r e l a t e d  e x p e r t  c o n f l i c t s  by 
s u b j e c t i n g  them t o  a  l e g a l  type of  p rocess .  The f a c t  t h a t  no such  i s s u e  
has  y e t  been r e s o l v e d  by such  a  p rocess  i n  r e a l  l i f e  i s  l e s s  s i g n i f i c a n t  
t han  the f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  i d e a  should  have o r i g i n a t e d  and c o n t i n u e s  t o  be 
advocated by t h e  impor t an t  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  and t h e  US 
Congress. 
I s h a l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  Sc ience  Courts  q u e s t i o n  l a t e r ,  b u t  h e r e  i t  is  
r e l e v a n t  o n l y  t o  p o i n t  o u t  : how problemat ic  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  of  s c i e n t i f i c  
u n c e r t a i n t i e s  and c o n f l i c t s  has  become f o r  t h e  p o l i c y  p roces s ;  how s t r o n g l y  
e x i s t s  t h e  a lmos t  au toma t i c  r e a c t i o n  t h a t  g r e a t e r  f o r m a l i s a t i o n  i s  r equ i r ed ;  
and t h e  f a i t h  t h a t  t h e  l e g a l  p roces s  o f f e r s  such  d e f i n i t i v e  s t r u c t u r i n g  t o  
produce r e s o l u t i o n .  I n  t h i s  paper  I want t o  d i s c u s s  some of  t h e  assumptions 
which appear  t o  be wide ly  h e l d  about  t h e  n a t u r e  of s c i e n t i f i c  consensus e ,  
(and by c o r o l l a r y ,  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  c o n f l i c t )  and which appear  t o  be most 
deep ly  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  i n  t h e  law. From what i s  r e a l l y  o n l y  a n  e x p l o r a t o r y  
d i s c u s s i o n ,  t h e  o n l y  conc lu s ions  I w i l l  draw a r e  t h a t  t h e  assumptions about  
1 
s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge and consensus h e l d  by law a r e  f a l s i f i e d  by s o c i o l o g i c a l  
and h i s t o r i c a l  examina t ion  of s c i e n c e ,  t h a t  t h e  consequences a r e  impor t an t  
e s p e c i a l l y  when wider  s o c i a l  i s s u e s  h i n g e  upon r e s o l v i n g  a n  e x p e r t  c o n f l i c t ,  
and t h a t  because of t h e s e  f a l s e  underp inn ings ,  l e g a l  p roces se s  a r e  n o t  
adequa te  means f o r  r e s o l v i n g  s c i e n t i f i c  d i s p u t e s .  It  is n o t  f a r f e t c h e d  t o  
s a y  t h a t  an  e n t i r e l y  new phi losophy  of  s c i e n t i f i c  e x p e r t i s e  i s  needed i n  
t h e  law, though I must ernphasise t h a t  h e r e  I am, n o t  p r e t e n d i n g  to  make any 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h a t  e f f o r t  of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n .  
Legal  assumptions about  s c i e n c e  
Sc i ence  and l a w  r e p r e s e n t  d i f f e r e n t  systems o f  a u t h o r i t y .  Although 
which by d e f i n i t i o n  a r e  mul t id imens iona l ,  o f t e n  i n d i r e c t l y  connected and 
entangled.  S o c i a l  d i s c o u r s e  has to  be a  shor thand  form of c o m u n i c a t i o n ,  
condensing s e v e r a l  meanings and messages i n t o  s i n g l e  a c t i o n s  o r  u t t e r a n c e s ,  
whose symbolic o r  r h e t o r i c a l  a s p e c t  i s  thus  i n e v i t a b l y  impor tan t .  The 
j u d i c i a l  approach den ie s  the  e x i s t e n c e  of such a  m r l d ,  and f o r  i t s  own 
l i m i t e d  p r a c t i c a l  purposes  e r a d i c a t e s  i t  by the  a r t i f i c i a l  - i f  f u n c t i o n a l  - 
process  which i t  employs t o  r e f i n e  i s s u e s  i n t o  d i s c r e t e ,  one-dimensional 
(15) t e c h n i c a l  q u e s t i o n s  . 
A s t r i k i n g  example of j u d i c i a l  empir ic ism was g iven  i n  a  review of  
US l e g a l  ca se s  where c la ims  had been made f o r  compensation f o r  cance r  dea ths  
of v a r i o u s  k inds  (16) . These f e l l  i n t o  tm broad c a t e g o r i e s  : t hose  where 
a  t r auma t i c  p h y s i c a l  impact had been involved (e.g. a  f a l l ,  o r  p i e c e  of 
equipment h i t t i n g  t h e  even tua l  cancer  v i c t i m )  a t  t h e  s i t e  o f  t h e  cance r ;  
and those  i nvo lv ing  a  record  of  c h r o n i c  low l e v e l  exposure t o  agents  known 
t o  be ca rc inogen ic .  .The l a t t e r  type of c a s e  normally involves  o n l y  
p r o b a b i l i s t i c  ev idence ,  b u t  t h i s  has come. t o  be t r e a t e d  i n  h i g h l y  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  
manner by s c i e n t i f i c  e x p e r t s  w i th  ( t o  t h e  c o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  about  a l l o c a t i n g  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y )  r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  ranges  of  d i s p u t e  o v e r  r i s k  magnitudes.  
Never the less  t h e  cause-ef  f e c t  mechanisms invo lve  s t o c h a s t i c  p roces se s ,  
which a r e  h i g h l y  a b s t r a c t  concepts  t o  grasp .  Although t h e r e  a r e  no 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  accepted  mechanisms t o  e x p l a i n  cance r  format ion  by phys i ca l  
trauma, i n  immediate c o n c r e t e  e m p i r i c a l  terms t h e  cause  e f f e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
i s  "obvious". S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  the  p r o p o r t i o n  of  p h y s i c a l  trauma claims 
upheld was f a r  g r e a t e r  t han  t h a t  o f  low l e v e l  exposure c l a ims ,  even though 
accepted  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge would have m i l i t a t e d  t h e  oppos i t e .  I n  o t h e r  
words an a p p a r e n t l y  c o n c r e t e ,  e m p i r i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  was t r u s t e d  even 
though i t  could  n o t  be exp la ined  o r  j u s t i f i e d  by s c i e n c e ,  whereas an 
a b s t r a c t ,  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  accepted  r e l a t i o n s h i p  was more of t e n  t han  n o t  
r e j e c t e d .  
Another example occu r r ed  du r ing  t h e  Windscale I n q u i r y  when q u e s t i o n s  
were r a i s e d  about  t h e  l e v e l  o f  r e s e a r c h ,  moni tor ing  and s c i e n t i f i c  unde r s t and in  
of  environmental  contamina t ion  a t  Ravenglass ,  a  complex e s t u a r y  n e a r  t h e  
Windscale d i s c h a r g e  p i p e  t o  t h e  I r i s h  sea'''). Ob jec to r s ,  a s  p a r t  of t h e i r  
g e n e r a l  c a s e  about  l a c k  of  p rope r  c o n t r o l ,  were t r y i n g  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  
such r e s e a r c h  and unders tanding  was i nadequa te ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w i th  a  major 
expansion be ing  p r o j e c t e d ,  and w e r e  pur su ing  t h i s  cou r se  i n  ques t i on ing  a  
government s c i e n t i s t  i n  d e t a i l  about  r e s e a r c h .  When they asked whether 
c e r t a i n  measurements had e v e r  been made ( t o  a  nega t ive  r e p l y ) ,  Parker  
d r a m a t i c a l l y  ad journed  the  I n q u i r y ,  a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  s e r i o u s  a l l e g a t i o n s  
were being made about  unsa fe  l e v e l s  o f  a i r - con tamina t ion  a t  Ravenglass,  
and t h e s e  should  be meas'ured f o r t h w i t h  "so a s  t o  p u t  t h e  m a t t e r  beyond mere 
opinion" Even government and i n d u s t r y  s c i e n t i s t s  were s t agge red  by 
t h i s  u n r e a l i s t i c  demand and t h e  assumptions t h a t  l a y  beneath it. Not 
on ly  was a  complex, p r o j e c t i v e  and s o c i o l o g i c a l  argument (though invo lv ing  
empi r i ca l  ev idence)  be ing  conver ted  i n t o  a  c rude  c o n c r e t e  e m p i r i c a l  t e s t ,  
b u t  even t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of  t h i s  e m p i r i c a l  t e s t  - e s p e c i a l l y  how to  i n t e r p r e t  
r e s u l t s  ob t a ined  - was comple te ly  underes t imated .  I n  t h e  end, however, 
Parker  had h i s  way and the  s o c i a l  argument was du ly  submerged wi thou t  t r a c e  
a s  rushed measurements were made, contamina t ion  was found t o  be w e l l  below 
o f f i c i a l  l i m i t s ,  and a s  a  f i n a l  i n s u l t  o b j e c t o r s  were thus  roundly accused 
of scaremongering 1 
This  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  dese rves  wider  r e c o g n i t i o n  and d iscuss ion , .  
e s p e c i a l l y  w i th  ano the r  major  l e g a l  s e t - p i e c e  on n u c l e a r  power i n  t h e  o f f i n g ,  
and I have w r i t t e n  i t  up a t  g r e a t e r  l e n g t h  elsewhere.  However, t h e  
empir ic ism of j u d i c i a l  r a t i o n a l i t y  is  g e n e r a l l y  w e l l  r ecogn i sed (19 ) ,  and I 
w u l d  l i k e  t o  t u r n  t o  o t h e r ,  r e l a t e d  a s p e c t s  which h e l p  t o  unders tand  t h e  
i m p l i c i t  j u d i c i a l  model of s c i e n t i f i c  consensus,  indeed of  c o n f l i c t  and 
consensus g e n e r a l l y .  
Evidence and r educ t ion i sm 
Eggles tone  has  d i s cus sed  t h e  a r t i f i c i a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  j u d i c i a l  1 
f  a c t - f  i n d i n g  p roces s  : 
' t h e  e x i g e n c i e s  of  t h e  l e g a l  p rocess  r e q u i r e  t h a t  somewhere i n  t h e  
s e a r c h  f o r  t r u t h  a  h a l t  must be  c a l l e d ,  o t h e r w i s e  l i t i g a t i o n  would 
become i n t e r m i n a b l e  . . . 
What d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  j u d i c i a l  decis ion-making i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  c o u r t s  have l a i d  down r u l e s ,  which d i f f e r  i n  impor t an t  r e s p e c t s  
from those  fo l lowed i n  t h e  o r d i n a r y  a f f a i r s  o f  l i f e ,  f o r  t h e  c o n t r o l  
o f  t h e  f a c t - f i n d i n g  process  - /-i.e. how an i s s u e  i s  d e f i n e d  and resolved-7 
He g i v e s  t h e  example of t h e  S i m i l a r  Fac t s  r u l e .  I n  t h e  c o u r t s ,  ' I f  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  is  whether a  person  has  been n e g l i g e n t  on a  p a r t i c u l a r  occas ion ,  
ev idence  t h a t  he has  been n e g l i g e n t  on o t h e r  occas ions  w i l l  n o t  be admi t t ed '  (21) 
Yet t h i s  would be p r e c i s e l y  t h e  k ind  of ev idence  which i n  ' t h e  o r d i n a r y  
a f f a i r s  of l i f e f  and even i n  s c i e n c e ,  would i n f l u e n c e  assessment  of an  
i s s u e .  Likewise t he  q u e s t i o n  of p rev ious  conv ic t i on ;  t he  j u d i c i a l  f i c t i o n  
is  t h a t  t h e  i s s u e  can  be d e f i n i t e l y  dec ided  by f a c t  a lone ,  y e t  i n  r e a l i t y ,  
such  informal  circurns t a n t i a l  f a c t o r s  and q u e s t i o n s  of t r u s  twor th ines s  , 
c r e d i b i l i t y  etc. p lay  an impor tan t  r o l e  i n  dec id ing  because t h e  f a c t s  a lone  
a r e  h a r d l y  e v e r  s u f f i c i e n t .  I n  o t h e r  w r d s ,  i n  t h e  j u d i c i a l  moulding of I 
I 
an i s s u e ,  h i s t o r i c a l  and s o c i o l o g i c a l  c a t e g o r i e s  of  thought  and judgement - ! 
t h e  complex s t u f f  o f  r e a l  s o c i a l  a f f a i r s  - a r e  excluded.  Th i s  is  extremely I 
I 
impor tan t  when j u d i c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  asked to t r e s p a s s  i n t o  s o c i a l  and ~ 
p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s .  I 
Eggles tone  has  - a l s o  d i s cus sed  how mast i f  n o t  a l l  l e g a l  judgements ~ 
a r e  based upon f a c t u a l  knowledge which i s  inadequate  i n  a t  l e a s t  two I 
r e s p e c t s  : 
( a )  i t  may be s imply imposs ib le  t o  v e r i f y  o r  r e f u t e  w i th  much conf idence ;  and 
(b)  i t  may be i n e x t r i c a b l y  bound up w i t b t a c i t  a s p e c t s  of judgement which 
cannot  be f u l l y  s p e c i f i e d  and cross-checked.  
The f i r s t  a s p e c t  is  s e l f - e v i d e n t ,  bu t  Eggles tone  i l l u s t r a t e s  what i s  meant 
by t h e  second one. When a  w i tnes s  t e s t i f i e s ,  f o r  example, t o  a  p a r t y ' s  
i n t o x i c a t i o n ,  o r  exhaus t ion ,  e lements  of f a c t u a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  and e v a l u a t i o n  
e n t e r  i n t o  t o g e t h e r .  Legal  examinat ion demands t o t a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of  a l l  
t h e  f a c t o r s  i n  t h a t  w i t n e s s ' s  obse rva t ion .  But w i tnes se s  w i l l  n o t  be a b l e  
t o  r e c a l l  and e x p l i c a t e  a l l  t h e  p r e c i s e  p h y s i c a l  s i g n s  by which the  v i s i o n  
a t  t h e  t ime was taken  to  mean i n t o x i c a t i o n  o r  exhaus t ion .  
I n  o t h e r  words,  t h e  r o l e  of  non-expl icab le ,  t a c i t  f a c t o r s  i n  judgement 
i s  much more i n f l u e n t i a l  t han  commonly r ecogn i sed ,  even i n  a p p a r e n t l y  
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  f a c t u a l  obse rva t ions .  This  has  been r ecogn i sed  f o r  
s c i e n t i f i c  o b s e r v a t i o n  too ( 2 2 ) .  The g e n e r a l  p o i n t  which Eggles tone  makes 
of t h e s e  i n s i g h t s  is  t h a t  s u c h  in fo rma l ,  t a c i t  a s p e c t s  o f  ' f a c t u a l  t r u t h s '  
a r e  n o t  acknowledged i n  t h e  law, whose judgements a r e  always couched i n  
terms of f a l s e  c e r t a i n t i e s  and a b s o l u t e s ;  i n  j u d i c i a l  a n a l y s i s  c o n d i t i o n a l ,  
p a r t i a l  o r  q u a l i f i e d  t r u t h s  a r e  unknown; y e t  i n  r e a l i t y ,  t hose  v e r d i c t s  
a r e  based upon a  complex i n t e r a c t i o n  of  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  and i n t u i t i v e  
judgements and a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  whose l o g i c a l  r u l e s  a r e  u n c e r t a i n  and insecure .  
For example t h e  well-known though n o t  fo rma l ly  recognised  r e s o r t  to ' t h e  
demeanour of t h e  w i t n e s s v  as  a  way of a s s e s s i n g  t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of evidence 
i s  an i n e v i t a b l e  n e c e s s i t y  i n  t h e  many cases  where t h e  ba re  f a c t s  a r e  
inconclus ive .  S i g n i f i c d n t l y ,  many s o c i o l o g i c a l  s t u d i e s  of  s c i e n t i f i c  
con£ l i c t  have documented s i m i l a r  ad hominem methods o f  a s s e s s i n g  competing 
b e l i e f s  (23)  
Ref lex ive  r eason inq  
A f u r t h e r  p o i n t  which undermines t h e  i d e a  of  rule-bound c e r t a i n t y  o r  
i n e v i t a b i l i t y  concerns n o t  on ly  the  f a c t - f i n d i n g  p r o c e s s ,  b u t  a l s o  t h e  
employment of the  e v a l u a t i v e  r u l e s  from which a  d e c i s i o n  is supposedly 
deduced. I n  t h e  o f f i c i a l  v e r s i o n  o f  j u d i c i a l  reason ,  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
i n t e r p r e t i v e  p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  obvious and c l e a r c u t .  The judge supposedly 
s e e s  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r u l e ,  f i n d s  t h e  f a c t s ,  o b j e c t i v e l y  a p p l i e s  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
r u l e  t o  those  o b j e c t i v e  f a c t s  and d e c l a r e s  an o b j e c t i v e  v e r d i c t .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  
however, n o t  on ly  a r e  t h e  f a c t s  o f t e n  ambiguous both  i n  t h e i r  r e l evance  and 
t r u t h f u l n e s s ,  bu t  a l s o  t h e  r e l e v a n t  l e g a l  r u l e  i s  o f m n  a  m a t t e r  o f  choice.  
So too is t h e  way i n  which i t  may be app l i ed  to  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  i n  
hand (24) 
What appears  t o  happen most o f t e n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  is  t h a t  t h e  judge f i r s t  
apprehends a  v e r d i c t  on the b a s i s  of  i n t u i t i o n ;  t h i s  is sharpened of course  
by ev idence  and l o g i c  a s  w e l l  a s  by moral ou t look  and exper ience .  He then  
seeks  a  s t r u c t u r e  of reason  which j u s t i f i e s  t h a t  v e r d i c t  i n  terms of 
o b j e c t i v e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  l o g i c a l  r u l e s ,  and f a c t s .  This  r e c o n s t r u c t e d  
r a t i o n a l i t y  lends  t h e  judgement a  spu r ious  a i r  o f  n o n - a r b i t r a r i n e s s ,  
o b j e c t i v i t y  and e m p i r i c a l  i n e v i t a b i l i t y  and c e r t a i n t y .  Balances of  
p r o b a b i l i t y ,  margins of c r e d i b i l i t y ,  and o t h e r  open choices  i n  judgement 
a r e  converted i n t o  a  p u b l i c  language o f  b l ack  and wh i t e ,  i n e v i t a b l y  determined 
t r u t h s .  This  i s  of cou r se  a  s u c c e s s f u l  r i t u a l  f o r  ga in ing  wider a u t h o r i t y .  
Holmes was an e a r l y  con£ e s s o r  o f  t h i s  complexi ty under ly ing  t h e  
apparent  c e r t a i n t y  o f  j u d i c i a l  reason  : 
'The f a l l a c y  of  t h e  l o g i c a l  form ... f l a t t e r s  t h a t  l ong i ng  f o r  
c e r t a i n t y  and r epos e  which is i n  eve ry  human mind. But c e r t a i n t y  
g e n e r a l l y  is  i l l u s o r y ,  and r epose  n o t  t h e  d e s t i n y  of  man. Behind 
t h e  l o g i c a l  form l i e s  a  judgement a s  t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e  wor th  and 
importance of  com(eting l e g i s  l a t i v e  g rounds ,  o f  t e n  an i n a r t i c u l a t e d  
and unconscious  judgement i t  is t r u e ,  and y e t  t h e  v e r y  r o o t  and 
ne rve  of  t h e  whole proceeding.  You c a n  g i v e  any c o n c l u s i o n  i n  a  
l o g i c a l  form' (25) 
Another judge,  C hance l l o r  Kent,  was even more f r a n k  i n  h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  
h i s  own method : 
1 1  saw where j u s t i c e  l a y ,  and t h e  mora l  s e n s e  dec i ded  t h e  c o u r t  h a l f  
t h e  t ime. I t h en  s a t  down t o  s e a r c h  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  / - i . e .  t h e  
- 
s t a n d a r d  r e f e r e n c e  works on l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e s  and p r e c e d e n t s  7 . . . 
- 
I might  once  i n  a  wh i l e  be  embar rassed  by a  t e c h n i c a l  r u l e ,  b u t  I 
a lmos t  always found p r i n c i p l e s  s u i t e d  t o  my v iew o f  t h e  c a s e '  (26)  
I t  i s  i n  t h i s  endemic inadequacy of  t h e  r u l e s  t o  d i c t a t e  ' f o r  themse lves '  
a n  o b j e c t i v e  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  o r  d e c i s i o n ,  t h a t  t h e  whole q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s  o f  
j u d i c i a l  ' c r e a t i v i t y 1  i n  p o l i t i c a l  o r  s o c i a l  a f f a i r s .  Whereas t h e i r  
judgements a r e  exp re s s ed  i n  terms of  a p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t i v i t y ,  t h i s  concea l s  
t h e  p o i n t s  a t  which t a c i t  c h o i c e s  have  had to be made, between competing 
p r i n c i p l e s  and premises ,  o r  between compet ing p a r t i e s '  c r e d i b i l i t y .  Of t en  
t h e s e  cho i ce s  and assumptions  e n t a i l  mora l  o r  s o c i a l  v a l u e s ,  e.g. assumptions .  
a s  t o  where a u t h o r i t y  r e s i d e s  i n  s o c i e t y ,  what c o n s t i t u t e s  ' t h e  r e a s o n a b l e  
man', o r  'what i s  customary1 e t c . .  Thus as many a n a l y s t s  o f  t h e  j u d i c i a r y  
have  no t ed ,  behind t h e  f a c a d e  of  o b j e c t i v i t y  t h e r e  i s  ample s cope  f o r  t h e  
i n a d v e r t e n t  i n f l u e n c e  o f  s o c i a l  v a l u e s  and presumpt ions  - "the known o r  
exper ienced  f a c t s  of  s o c i a l ,  economic and p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  t h e  t ime and 
p l a c e  ... become p roce s s ed  i n t o  judgement" (27) 
It appears  t h a t  t h e  complex and d e l i c a t e  t i s s u e  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  
a c t i v i t y  i n  which s c i e n t i s t s  o p e r a t e ,  and which is u s u a l l y  ambiguous and 
open-ended, is n o t  r e cogn i s ed  by t h e  l e g a l  mind. The re  a r e  p r a c t i c a l  
r e a so ns  why this might  be  s o  - i t  i s  e a s i e r  as a  n o n - s c i e n t i s t  t o  c o n t r o l  
a  s c i e n t i f i c  e x p e r t  i n  c o u r t  by keep i ng  t o  c o n c r e t e  f a c t s  where one  might  
be  a b l e  t o  them, r a t h e r  than  a l l owi ng  thexu t o  roam where t h e y  
cannot  be £01 lowed, i n t o  t h e i r  own s p e c i a l i s t  t h e o r e t i c a l  w r l d .  However, 
t he  more fundamental reason must be connected wi th  the  j u d i c i a l  c raving  
f o r  rule-bound c e r t a i n t y  i n  ana lys i s .  Recognising t h e  ambiguous and 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  incomplete  n a t u r e  of a l l  s c i e n t i f i c  f a c t ,  observa t ions  and 
p r i n c i p l e s ,  would be tafitamount t o  i t s  r ecogn i t ion  f o r  l e g a l  knowledge too ,  
given the  g r e a t  e x t e n t  t o  which law c u l t i v a t e s  i t s  own s o c i a l  a u t h o r i t y  by 
r e f e r e n c e  t o  e m p i r i c i s t  p o s i t i v i s t  models of s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge. 
I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  judges sometimes make g r e a t  emphasis of  t h e  
inadequacies  of s c i e n t i f i c  evidence i n  s p e c i f i c  i n s t a n c e s ,  b u t  t h i s  is  no t  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  l o y a l t y  t o  the  gene ra l  i d e o l o g i c a l  p r i n c i p l e .  It i s  a  
common j u d i c i a l  theme t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  have t o  be helped t o  express  t h e  
t r u e  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  by the  r igo rous ,  p r e c i s e  d i s c i p l i n e  of l e g a l  
examination, because (al though s c i e n c e  may i n  p r i n c i p l e  by p r e c i s e  and 
o b j e c t i v e )  i n d i v i d u a l  s c i e n t i s t s  a r e  o f t e n  b i a s sed  o r  woolly-headed, and 
cannot  d i s e n t a n g l e  o b j e c t i v e  f a c t  from t h e i r  own op in ions  a s  purely a s  
(28) they should be a b l e  t o  . 
Fac t s  emptied of  v a l u e  
Not on ly  i s  t h e  a c t i v e  i n t e r p r e t i v e  i n f u s i o n  of f a c t s  unrecognised 
by j u d i c i a l  thought ,  b u t  t h e r e  is  a l s o  a  corresponding confidence i n  the  
complete s e p a r a b i l i t y  of f a c t s  from 'mere argumentf ,  va lues  o r  emotions. 
This  is  enshr ined  i n  t h e  l e g a l  process where t h e r e  i s  t h e  s t a g e  of evidence, 
f o s t e r e d  by p roof s  of evidence;  then t h e  completely s e p a r a t e  s t a g e  of 
submiss ions  a s  to  t h e  c o r r e c t  i n t e r p r e t i v e  p r i n c i p l e s  to  apply t h a t  evidence. 
Time af t e r  t i m e  t h i s  f i c t i o n  was impressed upon bemused o b j e c t o r s  a t  
Windscale, innocent  of l e g a l  t r a d i t i o n s ,  when Parker  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  they were 
indulg ing  i n  'mere argument' r a t h e r  than i n  f i n d i n g  f a c t s .  Indeed Parker  
made h i s  approach p l a i n  a t  t he  pre l iminary  meeting, i n  which he emphasised 
t h a t  he had no d e c i s i o n s  t o  make, and had only  to  f i n d  the  f a c t s .  
I t  is n o t  only '  i n  s t r o n g l y  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s  where t h i s  p o s i t i v i s t i c  
b e l i e f  leads  t o  confus ion  o r  worse. An i l l u s t r a t i o n  i s  taken from the  use  
of p s y c h i a t r i c  knowledge i n  t h e  cour t s .  The American ' ~ u d ~ e  Bazelon has 
been involved i n  many cases  where evidence has been g iven  a s  t o  t h e  mental 
s t a t e  and c r i m i n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of the  accused,  even when i t  had been 
accepted  t h a t  they  had committed a  c r i m i n a l  ac t (29 ) .  This  has  been a  
vexed problem e v e r  s i n c e  t he  e a r l i e s t  u se s  of  e x p e r t  ev idence  on t h e  
ques t i on .  The 1843 MINaghten Rules r e q u i r e d  p s y c h i a t r i s t s  t o  tes t i £  y  to 
whether o r  n o t  def endancs could  know they  w e r e  a c t i n g  c r i m i n a l l y .  The 
p s y c h i a t r i s t s  f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  r u l e  begged impor t an t  q u e s t i o n s .  I t  a l s o  
l e f t  t h e i r  r o l e  r e s t r i c t e d  y e t  a t  t h e  same t ime c o n t r o v e r s i a l  because t h e i r  
tes t imony under  t h i s  r u l e  i n e v i t a b l y  t r e s p a s s e d  upon t h e  s a c r e d  r i g h t  o f  
t h e  j u ry  t o  d e c i d e  t h e  moral i s s u e s  of  g u i l t .  T h e i r  e x p e r t i s e  was supposed 
on ly  t o  speak  t o  t h e  f a c t s .  Assuming t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  between f a c t s  and 
moral  e v a l u a t i o n  t o  be  c a t e g o r i c a l l y  ach i evab le ,  i n  1954 Judge Bazelon 
r e v i s e d  t h e  r u l e  i n  t h e  Durham case .  The Durham r u l e  he ld  t h a t  i f  t h e  
defendant ' s  a c t  was t h e  'p roduct  of mental  d i s e a s e  o r  menta l  d e f e c t ' ,  t hen  
h e  o r  s h e  must n o t  be d e c l a r e d  g u i l t y .  Bazelon assumed t h a t  t h i s  r u l e  
would a l l ow  p s y c h i a t r i s t s  t o  advance a  wider  range  of  s c i e n t i f i c  f a c t s  
r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  case .  On t h e  s t r e n g t h  of h i s  p o s i t i v i s t  j u d i c i a l  assumptions,  
h e  a l s o  be l i eved  t h a t  t h i s  freedom t o  o f f e r  a  range of f a c t s  would remove 
t h e  p s y c h i a t r i s  t s  ' d i f f i c u l t y  i n  s e p a r a t i n g  f a c t s  f  rorc op in ions  and 
a s s e r t i o n s  which t r e s p a s s e d  on  t h e  j u ry ' s  e v a l u a t i v e  r o l e .  I n  r e a l i t y  
i t  d i d  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  r e v e r s e ,  because unrecognised by t h e  c o u r t ,  t h e  n e d  
f a c t s  so  opened up were a l l ,  l i k e  a l l  o t h e r  s c i e n t i f i c  f a c t s ,  couched i n  
t h e o r e t i c a l  frameworks which i n  t h e  ve ry  p roces s  of  g i v i n g  them meaning 
a l s o  l e n t  them i m p l i c a t i o n s  which i n e v i t a b l y  tended t o  imply g u i l t  o r  
innocence and thus  cont inued  to t r e s p a s s  on  t h e  c o u r t ' s  a u t h o r i t y .  They 
could n o t  e x i s t  a s  f a c t s  w i thou t  t h e s e  i n t e r p r e t i v e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s .  The 
j u d i c i a l  approach assumed t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t  - o r  c a n  exist - p u r e  e m p i r i c a l  
f a c t s ,  o f  s o l f - c o n t a i n e d  meaning independent  o f  any such  i n t e r p r e t i v e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  ( 'mere op in ion '  a s  t h e  law would c a l l  t he se ) .  T h i s  k i n d  of 
confus ion  and c o n f l i c t  h a s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  t h e  u s e  of e x p e r t  ev idence  from 
a l l  f i e l d s  i n  t h e  c o u r t s .  The assumption t h a t  f a c t  and o p i n i o n  a r e  
s t r i c t l y  s e p a r a b l e  con t inues  t o  s u r v i v e  a s  a  p r a c t i c a l  myth d e s p i t e  
r e g u l a r  f a l s i f i c a t i o n  a s  wi tnessed  i n  t h e  ch ron ic  d i f f i c u l t y  o v e r  t h e  u s e  
of e x p e r t  evidence.  
A f u r t h e r  enlargement  upon t h i s  p o i n t  i s  necessary .  S c i e n t i f i c  f a c t s  
may be s u f f u s e d  wi th  i n t e r p r e t i v e  l i f e ,  b u t  when t h i s  i s  i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  
courtroom, i t  i s  u s u a l l y  inmedia te ly  taken t h a t  such  t h e o r e t i c a l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  i n d i v i d u a l  i n  o r i g i n ,  r a t h e r  than t h e  r e s u l t  of a  very  
g r e a t  dea l  of s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  - o f t e n  informal  - between t h e  exper ts  i n  
a  f i e l d .  B u i l t  i n t o  ' a  s c i e n t i f i c  f a c t t  may be a  l i t t l e  empi r i ca l  
obse rva t ion ,  and a  g r e a t  d e a l  of s o c i a l  n e g o t i a t i o n  between those  e x p e r t s ,  
as  to t he  meaning of t hose  obse rva t ions .  Even what is an empi r i ca l  
observa t ion  may be t h e  s u b j e c t  of a  g r e a t  d e a l  of n e g o t i a t i o n  between 
s c i e n t i s t s .  The r e s u l t  is t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  t r u t h  is  much more a  f r a g i l e  
achievement of c o l l e c t i v e  i n t e r a c t i o n ,  n e g o t i a t i o n  and s o c i a l  consensus 
than i s  recognised  i n  the  i d e a  i n h e r i t e d  from more e m p i r i c i s t  t imes,  of 
t r u t h s  d i c t a t e d  by t h e  i n h e r e n t  l o g i c  and meaning of r evea led  f a c t s .  When 
t h i s  e l a b o r a t e ,  s o c i a l l y  roo ted ,  and informal  i n t e r p r e t i v e  e d i f i c e  i s  
revealed by l e g a l  processes  which u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y  demand a b s o l u t e  empi r i ca l  
proof ,  t he  assumption of t h e  j u d i c i a r y  tends t o  be t h a t  s i n c e  it is  no t  
empir ica l  proof i t  must be mere i n d i v i d u a l  op in ion ,  r a t h e r  than  t h e  
arduously r e f i n e d  c o l l e c t i v e  opin ion  of many s p e c i a l i s t s .  It may be t h a t  
sometimes such test imony i s  indeed -based upon an  i d i o s y n c r a t i c  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  evidence i n ' a  g iven  s c i e n t i f i c  f i e l d ,  b u t  t he  
cour t s  appear t o  assume t h a t  t h a t  i s  a l l  t h e r e  eve r  is  beyond t h e  hard 
f a c t s  . 
On t h i s  assumption about  s c i e n c e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  any c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  
s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge might be in fused  wi th  s o c i a l  f a c t o r s  can o n l y  be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  as  an a l l e g a t i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l  b i a s  and co r rup t ion .  It i s  
s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  t h i s  i s  p r e c i s e l y  how Parker  t r e a t e d  such c r i t i c i s m s  a t  
t h e  Windscale Inqu i ry ,  a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  : 
'I have no doubt a s  to  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  those  concerned i n  a l l  of 
( t h e  c o n t r o l l i n g  a u t h o r i t i e s )  and I rega rd  t h e  a t t a c k s  made upon 
them as being wi thout  foundat ion.  Such a t t a c k s  d id  no th ing  to 
f u r t h e r  t he  cases  of t hose  who made them and a t  t imes reached a  
l e v e l  of a b s u r d i t y  which was p o s i t i v e l y  harmful to  t hose  c a s e s t  (30) 
Yet v i r t u a l l y  a l l  t h e s e  a t t a c k s  were made n o t  upon t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of t h e  
people i n  those  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  but  on t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  i n t e g r i t y  of t h e  system 
- an e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  ma t t e r .  The arguments were t h a t  wi thout  a  
p l u r a l i s  t i c  s  t r u c t u r e  of r e s e a r c h  and c r o s s - c r i t i c i s m ,  'and a  completely 
open s t anda rds  s e t t i n g  p rocess ,  e s p e c i a l l y  wi th  so  many ex-nuclear  i ndus t ry  
personnel  t he  c o n t r o l l i n g  bodies  m u i d  i n e v i t a b l y  tend t o  develop t h e i r  
knowledge - t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  incomplete  and ambiguous evidence e t c .  1 
i n  d i r e c t i o n s  which po r t r ayed  nuc l ea r  energy i n  a  f avourab le  l i g h t .  On 
t h e  i n t e r p r e t i v e  m d e l  of  s c i e n c e ,  t h i s  s t r u c t u r a l  b i a s  can be  recognised  
wi thout  implying anyth ing  about  pe r sona l  i n t e g r i t y .  It  j u s t  acknowledges 
t h a t  t h e  s o c i a l  c o n t e x t s - w i t h i n  which s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge i s  produced, 
have some i n f l u e n c e  upon t h a t  knowledge. The p o s i t i v i s t  j u d i c i a l  model 
of s c i e n c e  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, has  t o  t r e a t  any b i a s  a s  more o r  less 
d e l i b e r a t e ,  and u s u a l l y  (because of  its t r a d i t i o n s  o f  i nd iv idua l i sm)  as 
i n d i v i d u a l  b i a s .  The p o s i t i v i s t  accounts  of  s c i e n c e  i n  phi losophy have 
tended t o  e x a c t l y  t h e  same f a l l a c y ,  by assuming t h a t  t h e  o n l y  a l t e r n a t i v e  
t o  a b s o l u t e ,  o b j e c t i v e l y  determined s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge is  rampant 
\ = L I  sub jec t iv i sm and r e l a t i v i s m  . 
Formal and informal  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  of knowledae 
One can  s e e  f u r t h e r  r e s u l t s  of  t h e  p o s i t i v i s t  assumption i n  s e v e r a l  
p laces .  For  example t h e r e  has  been l i t t l e  o r  no d i s c u s s i o n  a s  f a r  a s  I 
know, of  t h e  problem of hea r say  ev idence  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  e x p e r t  w i tnes se s .  
Yet g iven  t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge i s  developed and d i f f u s e d  n o t  s o  much 
by independent  tes t i n g  b u t  by s o c i a l  t r ansmis s  i o n  v i a  e s t a b l i s h e d  a u t h o r i t y  
p a t t e r n s ,  i n fo rma l  hea r say  ev idence  i s  an e s s e n t i a l  component of  s c i e n t i f i c  
knowledge. Impor tan t  w r k  has  o f t e n  n o t  even reached t h e  formal  l i t e r a t u r e ,  
so  t h a t  d i r e c t  pe r sona l  c i t i n g  i s  u s u a l l y  neces sa ry  too. A l l  t h i s  is  a  
form of  hea r say ,  which is p r o h i b i t e d  i n  l a y  tes t i m n y ,  and which has  n o t  
been adequate ly  c l a r i f i e d  i n  t h e  l e g a l  r o l e  o f  e x p e r t i s e  because  t h e  
f a l s e  model o f  s c i e n c e  employed does n o t  even r e c o g n i s e  t h e  problem. A 
v i v i d  example of  t h i s  was g iven  a t  t h e  Windscale I n q u i r y ,  when an American 
e x p e r t  r a d i o b i o l o g i s t  s e n t  h i s  s c i e n t i f i c  tes t imony,  based upon m r k  which 
had n o t  y e t  t hen  reached t h e  formal  l i t e r a t u r e .  Ekpect ing t o  engage i n  
a  s c i e n t i f i c  d e b a t e  w i t h  t h e  T r ibuna l ' s  e x p e r t  a s s e s s o r  i n  r a d i o b i o l o g y  on 
h i s  r e c e n t  r e s e a r c h ,  h e  was shocked t o  f i n d  h i s  t es t imony d ismissed  because 
of  i t s  i n fo rma l  up - to -da t e  grounding. What could  be  n e g o t i a t e d  a s  a c c e p t a b l e  
knowledge w i t h i n  a  s c i e n t i f i c  s u b c u l t u r e  cou ld  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  be a c c e p t a b l e  
t o  u t t e r l y  formal  l e g a l  demands f o r  documented e m p i r i c a l  p roof .  A f u r t h e r  
more g e n e r a l  example o f  t h i s  m i s f i t  between t h e  informal '  n a t u r e  o f  s c i e n c e  
and its v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  f o r m a l i s t i c  l e g a l  assumptions about  
proof was g iven  i n  a  paper  by l e g a l  counse l  who d i sp l ayed  t h e  almost  
l imit less  p o i n t s  where accepted  forms of a u t h o r i t y  and meaning wi th in  a  
s c i e n t i f i c  s p e c i a l t y  could  b e  made t o  look a r b i t r a r y  when r u t h l e s s l y  
(32) pursued f o r  t h e i r  e m p i r i c a l  o r  l o g i c a l  s u p p o r t  . 
The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge i s  b u i l t  more upon s o c i a l  
p rocesses  and t a c i t  judgements which develop and change formal  r u l e s  and 
s c i e n t i f i c  norms r a t h e r  than  mechanica l ly  r e f l e c t  them. It i s  thus  an 
e l a b o r a t e  s o c i a l  achievement of in formal  p r o c e s s e s ,  which a r e  concealed by 
the  formal  l o g i c  and r a t i o n a l  i n v a r i a n t  r u l e s  o f  which p u b l i c  accounts  of  
s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge a r e  c r e a t e d .  I n  this ,  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge i s  
i d e n t i c a l  t o  j u d i c i a l  decision-making. The key d i s t i n c t i o n  must  be t h a t  
t h e  law o p e r a t e s  i n  an i n e v i t a b l y  p u b l i c  s e t t i n g  which i s  l ong -e s t ab l i shed ,  
and formal i sed .  It t h e r e f o r e  employs u t t e r l y  depe r sona l i s ed  languages and 
norms. S c i e n t i f i c  knowledge i s  c r e a t e d  i n  r e l a t i v e l y  ve ry  s m a l l ,  in formal  
s o c i a l  groups w i th  fuzzy  boundar ies ,  and t h e  knowledge i s  c r e a t e d  f o r  t h a t  
in formal  s u b c u l t u r e .  It can a f f o r d  t o  r e t a i n  a  degree  of  ambigui ty  and 
s o c i a l  r e f e r e n c e  which l e g a l  d e c i s i o n s  cannot .  This  is  t r u e  u n t i l  t h e  
s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge 'goes p u b l i c ' ,  when t h e  problems of  s o c i a l  meaning and 
c r e d i b i l i t y  a r i s e .  I n  l e g a l  p roces se s ,  s c i e n t i s t s  a r e  s u b j e c t e d  to formal  
c ross -examina t ion ,  judged by u n r e a l i s  t i c a l  l y  e m p i r i c i s t ,  fo rmal  and p o s i t i v i s t  
expec t a t i ons .  No k i n d  of  knowledge could s u s t a i n  i t s  c r e d i b i l i t y  when 
s u b j e c t e d  t o  t h e s e  c r i t e r i a .  Judges and t h e i r  r ea son ing  a r e  n o t  exposed 
t o  such a  r a d i c a l  s c e p t i c a l  s cou r ing ,  and a s  t h e  e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s i o n  shows, 
t h e i r  c r e d i b i l i t y  would a l s o  b e  des t royed  i f  they w e r e .  Thi s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  
freedom t o  d e s t r o y  any s c i e n t i f i c  t es t imony i s  u s e f u l  f o r  the a u t h o r i t y  of  
t h e  j u d i c i a r y  o v e r  s c i e n c e ,  because i f  a l l  s i d e s  have been conquered, it  
a l lows  whichever s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge f i t s  t h e  o v e r a l l  view o f  t h e  judge 
to be r e c o n s t r u c t e d  i n  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  v e r d i c t .  Eggles tone  and T r i b e  
bo th  u n d e r l i n e  t h i s  r i t u a l  e lement  of  t h e  u s e  of  s c i e n t i f i c  e x p e r t i s e  and 
r a t i o n a l - l o g i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  when they  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i t  is used  more f o r  
c o l l e c t i v e  r e a s s u r a n c e  i n  t h e  % a u t h o r i t y  of  judgements t han  f o r  judgement 
p e r  se(33).  AS Arnold has  a l s o  pu t  it  more g e n e r a l l y ,  "the f u n c t i o n  of law 
is n o t  s o  much t o  gu ide  s o c i e t y  a s  t o  comfort  it" w i t h  the p r e t e n c e  o f  
(34) 
o r d e r ,  c e r t a i n t y  and reason  . 
The Adversary Process  
The d e l i b e r a t e l y  adve r sa ry  n a t u r e  of l e g a l  p roces se s  i s  probably 
t h e i r  most widely c r i t i c i s e d  and l e a s t  unders tood  p r o p e r t y ,  y e t  it is  a l s o  
t h e i r  most c e n t r a l  p r i n c i p l e .  I t  is  o f t e n  most  s t r o n g l y  desp i sed  by those  
s c i e n t i s t s  who have experienced the  r i g o u r s  and f r u s t r a t i o n s  of having 
t h e i r  e x p e r t i s e  d i s s e c t e d  i n  ano the r  c o n t e x t  of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  beyond t h e i r  
(35) c o n t r o l ,  by good l e g a l  cross-examinat ion.  "Science" a s s e r t s  Boulding , 
"is a  problem-solving c u l t u r e  whose main v a l u e  i s  t r u th" ,  where "controversy 
i s  supposed t o  be  s e t t l e d  by some k ind  of appea l  to t h e  f a c t s  o r  o b s e r v a t i o n s  
r a t h e r  than  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o r  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  d i s p u t a n t s .  Arguments & 
horninem a r e  cons ide red  v e r y  bad form i n  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  community, and 
t h e r e  is  a  s t r o n g  e t h i c  of t r u t h - t e l l i n g  and v e r a c i t y . "  As a l r e a d y  no ted ,  
however, t h i s  p o l a r i s a t i o n  i n t o  t r u t h - t e l l i n g  o r  ad hominem judgement is  
too s i m p l i s t i c .  
I n  one s e n s e  t h e  adve r sa ry  process  should  be a t t r a c t i v e  t o  s c i e n t i s t s  , 
a t  l e a s t  a cco rd ing  t o  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  dominant v iew of s c i e n t i f i c  conduct.  
This  view has  it  t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  t h r i v e  on cr i t ic i sm and open a t t empt s  t o  
r e f u t e  each  o t h e r ' s  and indeed t h e i r  own w r k ,  a s  t h e  q u i n t e s s e n t i a l  
s a f egua rd  of  o b j e c t i v i t y  and c o n s t a n t  s e l f - c o r r e c t i o n .  As a l r e a d y  noted ,  
however, s c i e n t i s t s  do n o t  s eek  o u t  c o n f l i c t  i n  t h i s  f a s h i o n ;  they  tend  to 
shun it  and i n s t e a d  o r i e n t t h e m s e l v e s  s o c i a l l y  and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y  t o  more 
comfor tab le  f e l l o w - b e l i e v e r s .  They a r e  t h e r e f o r e  much less a t  home i n  an 
environment dominated by pu re  s c e p t i c i s m  and c r i t i c i s m  t han  might be  
supposed. Furthermore,  when, a s  of t e n  does happen, adve r sa ry  c o n d i t i o n s  
do a r i s e  w i t h i n  s c i e n c e  : 
(a)  t h e s e  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  less p u b l i c ;  
(b) they  a r e  l e s s  s t y l i s e d  and formal ;  
(c)  t hey  a r e  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  of  t h e  s o c i a l  groups of s c i e n t i s t s  
involved ,  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  t h e  c o n f l i c t  c an  be  managed w i t h i n  
t h e i r  own r ea sonab ly  c o h e r e n t  and f a m i l i a r  t r a d i t i o n s .  
None of  t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s  remain when t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  con£ l i c t  is 
t r a n s f e r r e d  i n t o  a  l e g a l  p rocess .  Thus even a l t hough  s o c i a l  a n a l y s i s  of 
s c i e n t i f i c  deba t e s  has  shown t h a t  ad hominem argument - supposedly t h e  
c o r r u p t i o n  unique  t o  l e g a l  (and p o l i t i c a l )  p roces se s  - i s  r o u t i n e l y  used 
t h e r e  a l s o ( 3 6 ) ,  i t s  necessary  use  can of t e n  be c o n t r o l l e d  and i n t e r p r e t e d  
by t h e  informal  c u l t u r a l  norms and t r a d i t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  s p e c i a l t y  concerned. 
I t  is  n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  f e l t  to be such an exp los ive  form of argument as  i t  
is  when employed by an a l i e n  c o n t r o l l i n g  c u l t u r e  (law) which does n o t  s h a r e  
t h e  s p e c i a l t y ' s  in formal  * c u l t u r a l  unders tandings  and i s  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  i t s  
s a n c t i o n s  and c o n t r o l s .  
C o n f l i c t  and c r e d i b i l i t y  
The fo rego ing  o u t l i n e  of t h e  s o c i a l  n a t u r e  of s c i e n c e  beneath i t s  
f o r m a l i s t i c  p u b l i c  images a l s o  exp la ins  ano the r  common a s p e c t  of s c i e n t i f i c  
con£ l i c t s  i n  l e g a l  s e t t i n g s  and elsewhere. A c e n t r a l  p a r t  of t h e  modern 
s o c i o l o g i c a l  account  of s c i e n c e  i s  t h a t  what s c i e n t i s t s  b e l i e v e  i s  n o t  t h e  
r e s u l t  o n l y  of t h e i r  own independent  r e s e a r c h ,  b u t  a l s o  of  what they a r e  
t o l d .  I f  con£ l i c t i n g  views a r e  advanced, t h e  s c i e n t i s t  may have 
inacequa te  d a t a  t L '  make a ~ o n f i d e n t  judgement i n  favour--of  one  school  of 
thought  o r  t h e  o t h e r .  This  may be t r u e  even f o r  h i s  own s p e c i a l i s m  where 
t h e  judgement may be e f f e c t i v e l y  a l r eady  made accord ing  to which school  of 
thought  i t  was i n  which he  was s o c i a l i s e d ,  and is even more t r u e  f o r  
judgements about  o t h e r  s p e c i a l i s m  from h i s  own. It i s  even more s t r o n g l y  
t r u e  f o r  t h e  n o n - s c i e n t i s t  who may have to judge between competing c la ims  
from s c i e n c e ,  n e i t h e r  of which can  be independent ly checked a g a i n s t  na tu re .  
I n  such c a s e s  t h e  decision-maker i s  forced  to r e l y  upon c r e d i b i l i t y -  
i n d i c a t o r s ,  such a s  formal  s t a t u s ,  e.g.  being P r o f e s s o r ,  FRS, r a t h e r  t han  
a  r e s e a r c h  s t u d e n t ;  having been wrong i n  prev ious  c o n f l i c t s  even i f  
u n r e l a t e d ;  appearing r easonab le  and detached r a t h e r  than emotional  o r  
over -bear ing;  having unpopular p o l i t i c a l  o r  r e l i g i o u s  a f f i l i a t i o n s ;  o r  
be ing  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  o t h e r  e x p e r t s  of h i g h  o r  low repu te .  
Thus one f i n d s  t h a t ,  a l though t h e  formal  p u b l i c  account  of s c i e n c e  
does n o t  r ecogn i se  it, s c i e n t i f i c  judgement e n t a i l s  such  c r e d i b i l i t y - f a c t o r s  
mixed i n  wi th  ' o b j e c t i v e '  a p p r a i s a l  of evidence.  I n  t a c i t  r e c o g n i t i o n  of 
t h i s ,  s c i e n t i f i c  c o n f l i c t s  o f t e n  ve ry  q u i c k l y  focus  upon such l ex t r aneous l  
p o i n t s  of  r e f e r e n c e .  Likewise t h e  l e g a l  process  o f t e n  uses  such c r e d i b i l i t y  
i n d i c e s  ' i n  making judgements, and cross-examinat ion i s  of  t e n  d i r e c t e d  t o  
t h a t e n d .  However, n e i t h e r  of t h e s e  a r e  recognised  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  se l f - image  
of  t h e  law, aga in  because t o  do so  would be t o  r ecogn i se  t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  ach iev ing  an a b s o l u t e l y  o b j e c t i v e  way of knowing and dec id ing .  The 
e x i s t i n g  means o f  s o c i a l  a u t h o r i t y  would t hus  be l o s t .  
A f i n a l  i m p l i c a t i o n  concerns b e l i e f s  about  t h e  n a t u r e  of  c o n f l i c t  
and how i t  shou ld  be r e so lved .  Inhe ren t  i n  t h e  view of  s c i e n c e  which I 
have a t t r i b u t e d  to t h e  j u d i c i a r y ,  is  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  where t h e r e  i s  c o n f l i c t  
between e x p e r t s ,  t h i s  is t h e  r e s u l t  of  one  s i d e  ( o r  bo th)  be ing  imprec ise ,  
incompetent ,  i d e o l o g i c a l  o r  o t h e r w i s e  b i a s s e d ,  and d e v i a t i n g  from what is 
t aken  t o  be  a s i n g l e  p r e c i s e  t r u t h  i n  p r i n c i p l e  d i s c o v e r a b l e  beneath 
con£ l i c t .  Consensus i s  t aken  to be n a t u r a l ,  because t h e  f a c t s ,  once s e e n  
c l e a r l y ,  'speak f o r  themselves  '. Many s c i e n t i s t s  and indeed t h e  p u b l i c  
t ake  t h i s  i d e a  f o r  g r a n t e d  t o o ,  s i n c e  t h e  p u b l i c  image o f  s c i e n c e  p o r t r a y s  
t h i s  myth(37).  It  i s  o f t e n  a rgued ,  when s c i e n t i s t s  a r e  involved  i n  p u b l i c  
c o n f l i c t ,  t h a t  i f  o n l y  they could  be l e f t  t o  d e b a t e  w i t h  one  ano the r  
untrammelled by t h e  emotive i n t e r e s t  o f  p r e s s u r e  group c o n t a c t s  etc., . t hey  
would f i n d  ' t h e '  consensus w i thou t  d i f f i c u l t y .  However This may b e  t r u e  
o n l y  when t h e  i s s u e  i s  d i sconnec t ed  s o  s e v e r e l y  a s  t o  be pos ing  a t e c h n i c a l  
problem no longe r  t h e  same a s  t h e  one  which was i n  t h e  middle  o f  a s o c i a l  
c o n f l i c t ,  and thus  no longer  r e l e v a n t .  More f r e q u e n t l y ,  though n o t  always, 
t h e  i n c r e a s e d  mutual  c o n t a c t  o f  e x p e r t s  i n  such  s o c i a l  i s s u e s  has  o n l y  
p o l a r i s e d  and developed c o n f l i c t ,  much t o  t h e  c h a g r i n  o f  s c i e n t i s t s  and 
o t h e r s  whose mythology abou t  n a t u r a l  consensus has  t hus  been cha l lenged .  
The r e sponse  t o  t h a t  counterev idence  has  u s u a l l y  been to e l a b o r a t e  t h e  
mythology, f o r  example by o f f e r i n g  v a r i o u s  ways o f  f u r t h e r  ' p u r i f y i n g t  
t h e  p r o c e s s ,  such a s  s c i e n c e  c o u r t s .  The l e g a l  s e t t i n g  is  one  such  p roces s ,  
wherein c ross -examina t ion  i s  supposed to expose whichever e x p e r t  p a r t y  i s  
concea l ing  its incompetence, b i a s  etc. and t h u s  l ead  d i r e c t l y  t o  r e s o l u t i o n  
of  t h e  c o n f l i c t .  Note t h a t  t h i s  b e l i e f  j u s t i f i e s  t h e  widespread c r o s s -  
examinat ion o f  e x p e r t s  o n  p e r s o n a l i s  t i c  and o t h e r  ' ex t raneous  ' grounds. It 
i s  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  t o o ,  t h a t  t h e  adversary  p r o c e s s  f o r  e x p e r t s  i s  s t a u n c h l y  
defended by many judges on  t h e  grounds t h a t  i f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  o f  exchanging 
e x p e r t  documents b e f o r e  a c a s e  were taken  too  f a r ,  t hen  t h e  neces sa ry  
o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  exposing t h e  incompetence o f  an e x p e r t  by s u r p r i s i n g  him i n  
c ross -examina t ion  b e f o r e  t h e  judge and j u r y  m u l d  b e  l o s t .  M r .  J u s t i c e  
(39) Parker  i s  an advoca te  o f  t h i s  view 
Most of  t h e  i s s u e s  i nvo lv ing  t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t i s e  a t  Windscale o n l y  
p r o l i f e r a t e d  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  c o n f l i c t ,  something which appeared to s u r p i s e  
and annoy Parker .  Thus he heard  day upon day of evidence and c r o s s -  
examinat ion on  r ad iob io logy  f o r  example, presumably i n  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  of 
i t s  reaching  a  conc lus ion .  Y e t  even af ter such p rod ig ious ly  expens ive  
e f f o r t  under h i s  l e g a l  d i s c i p l i n e  he was fo rced  to abandon t h e  p u r s u i t  of 
consensus and advance p r i n c i p l e s  which l e f t  r ad iob io logy  open-ended y e t  
which allowed him to r e a c h  a  d e c i s i o n  on THORP. Likewise f o r  energy demand 
and ( l e s s  so )  f o r  economics. From s t a t emen t s  made af  ter h i s  Windscale 
expe r i ence ,  a l l  Parker  appears  t o  have f e l t  from t h i s  f u r t h e r  s u b s t a n t i a l  
cha l l enge  t o  t h e  myth t h a t  a  p r o p e r l y  s t r u c t u r e d  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  m u l d  expose 
t h e  n a t u r a l  t r u t h ,  i s  t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  on  p a s s i o n a t e  i s s u e s  l i k e  
n u c l e a r  power, a r e  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  f o r c e  i n t o  c l a r i t y  of  thought ,  
i m p a r t i a l i t y  etc. ,  than  he  had p r e v i o u s l y  b e l i e v e d ,  b u t  n o t  t h a t  t h e  
(40) founding assumptions about  s c i e n t i f i c  thought  may be wrong . 
There was no r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  c o n f l i c t s  may e n t a i l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  even a s  t o  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  and s t a t u s  of  f a c t s ,  because they  on ly  
become f a c t s  w i t h i n  an i n t e r p r e t i v e  framework, and t h e s e  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  
l e g i t i m a t e  var ia t io r . .  Thus t h e  j ~ a i c i a l  model of  a u t h o r i t y  i n  s c i e n c e  
assumes i t  t o  be  n a t u r a l l y  mono l i t y i c  and o b j e c t i v e l y  determined.  This  is  
a  d i r e c t  analogy w i t h  t h e  j u d i c i a l  model of  mora l  knowledge and a u t h o r i t y  
i n  s o c i e t y .  I f  c o n f l i c t  is  viewed a s  p a t h o l o g i c a l ,  t hen  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  
i n e v i t a b l y  d e c l a r a t o r y ,  based on e x p e r t  d i s cove ry ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  compromises 
based upon n e g o t i a t i o n  and media t ion .  
Rat iona l i sm and p r e c i s i o n  
A f i n a l  b a s i c  a s p e c t  of j u d i c i a l  thought  which is r e l e v a n t  to o u r  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  is  i ts  r a t i o n a l i s m .  Shk la r  r e f e r s  to t h i s  a s  an u n r e a l i s t i c  
obses s ion  f o r  d e f i n i t i o n a l  c l a r i t y ;  b e l i e v i n g  t h e  r u l e s  of  thought  and 
judgement t o  be  p r e c i s e  and unambiguous, t h e  law has  c r e a t e d  l e v e r  more 
r e f i n e d  and r i g i d  systems of  formal  d e f i n i t i o n s  (which have) s e rved  to 
i s o l a t e  law comple te ly  from t h e  s o c i a l  c o n t e x t  w i t h i n  which i t  exists1 (41) 
Following t h e  p o s i t i v i s t  b e l i e f  t h a t  e m p i r i c a l  f a c t s  can  and do 
m i r r o r  r e a l i t y ,  i n  p r e c i s e  and p u r e  form, l e g a l i s m  a t t r i b u t e s  r e s i d u a l  
c o n f l i c t  t o  temporar i ly  imprec ise  d e f i n i t i o n  of a  concept  o r  r u l e ;  it  i s  
taken f o r  gran ted  t h a t  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  and g r e a t e r  p r e c i s i o n  w i l l  expose 
g r e a t e r  t r u t h ,  and thus  d i s s o l v e  the  c o n f l i c t .  I n  i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r o l e  
t he  j u d i c i a r y  more o r  l e s s  has t o  e x e r c i s e  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  s o c i a l  
r e a l i t y  ove r  which it  p r e s i d e s  is  indeed unambiguous, and t h a t  t h e  norms 
embodied i n  v e r d i c t s  w i l l  have unproblematic  meaning and a p p l i c a t i o n .  
I n  the  process  of j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of judgements, a s  we have a l r e a d y  
desc r ibed ,  ambiguous and c o n t e s t a b l e  terms and p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  o f t e n  g iven  
p a r t i c u l a r  meanings to s u i t  t h e  judgement i n  hand, and then  p re sen ted  a s  i f  
t h a t  were t h e i r  abso lu t e  o n t o l o g i c a l  meaning - t h e i r  e x a c t  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
of an o b j e c t i v e  t r u t h ,  r a t h e r  than  a  meaning chosen f o r  t h e  s p e c i f i c  
purposes i n  hand, o r  s imply r e f l e c t i n g  s o c i a l  v a l u e s  taken f o r  g ran ted  
by the  judge. A good example is  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  models of  
' t h e  reasonable  man1 i s sued  i n  judgements. Another i s  t aken  from t h e  
English Court  of Appeal, i n  a  c a s e  where an  employer had appealed a g a i n s t  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  of a n  i n d u s t r i a l  t r i b u n a l  i n  f avour  of  an employee who -had 
( 4 2 )  complained of u n f a i r  d i s m i s s a l  . The employer 's c a s e  r e s t e d  o n  t h e  
ground t h a t  t h e  p l a i n t i f f  had l e f t  h i s  complaint  u n t i l  o v e r  t h r e e  months 
a f t e r  d i s m i s s a l ,  and t h e  i s s u e  was whether t h r e e  m n t h s  had been a  
' reasonably p r a c t i c a b l e '  pe r iod  i n  which to  submi t  a  formal  compla in t  t o  
t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  t r i b u n a l .  C l e a r l y  t h e  term is  l e g i t i m a t e l y  c o n t e s t a b l e ,  
open to c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .  Yet t h e  Appeals Cour t ' s  a s s e r t i o n  was 
t h a t  'It i s  axiomat ic  t h a t  what i s  o r  i s  n o t  reasonably  p r a c t i c a b l e  i s  i n  
essence  a  q u e s t i o n  of f a c t  to be r e so lved  by a s c e r t a i n i n g  t h e  f a c t s '  ( 4 3 )  
Thus t h e  o p e r a t i n g  f i c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  c r u c i a l  meaning and thus  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
i s  d i scovered  and n o t  chosen, l eads  to t h e  r e i f i c a t i o n  of such  terms and 
d e f i n i t i o n s ,  and t o  t h e  corresponding b e l i e f  t h a t  r e a l i t y  is t o t a l l y  
comprehended by, o r  s u b o r d i n a t e  t o ,  t h e  impr in t  of  such  ' p r e c i s e '  d i scovered  
d e f i n i t i o n s  . 
The f o u r  c a s e  s t u d i e s  which Horowitz ana lyses  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  p o i n t  
c l e a r l y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  h i s  example of  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of e d u c a t i o n a l  r e sou rces  
between t h e  a f f l u e n t  whi te  and poor  b lack  a r e a s  of an  e d u c a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  
i n  New York ( 4 4 ) .  This  c a s e  was t r i e d  i n  t h e  c o u r t s  when t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  
were sued t o  e q u a l i s e  resources .  The judge i s s u e d  a  v e r d i c t  en fo rc ing  
e q u a l i s a t i o n ,  assuming t h a t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  was p r e c i s e  and unambiguous. The 
decree  f a i l e d  t o  achieve  any s i g n i f i c a n t  change, because  s o c i a l  r e a l i t y  
proved t o  be f a r  more corr.plex than  the  s imple  dec ree  had supposed. The 
f i r s t  d e f i n i t i o n  of  e q u a l i s a t i o n  involved p e r  c a p i t a  expend i tu re .  But what 
i f  t he  b e s t  t e a c h e r s ,  e.g. t he  ones w i th  most expe r i ence ,  went t o  t h e  whi te  
s choo l s  ? I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  t h i s  meant h ighe r  
aggrega te  s a l a r i e s ,  s o  d i d  one c u t  down t h e  number o f  t e a c h e r s  pe r  c a p i t a  
p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  i n  t h e  whi te  s choo l s ,  o r  d e f i n e  e q u a l i t y  o f  e d u c a t i o n a l  
r e sou rces  i n  terms of  s t a f f  -s t u d e n t  r a t i o ,  and concea l  t h e  problem ? How 
could one l e g i s l a t e  e d u c a t i o n a l  e q u a l i t y  ? The i s s u e  r e t u r n e d  to t h e  
c o u r t s  f o r  a  f u r t h e r  de t e rmina t ion  and t h e  ' r a t i o n a l '  d e f i n i t i o n  of  
educa t iona l  e q u a l i t y  w a s  f u r t h e r  r e f i n e d  o n  t h e  assumption t h a t  it could be 
p r e c i s e l y  and unambiguously s p e c i f i e d  a s  a  s e t  of  norms t o  be  obeyed. Yet 
aga in  i t  proved inadequa te  and y e t  aga in  it  was r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e  c o u r t s .  
This  p roces s  exempl i f i e s  t h e  analogy between l e g a l  s c i e n t i s m  and b u r e a u c r a t i c  
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  r ecogn i sed  i n  c l a s s i c a l  s o c i o l o g i c a l  unders tanding .  
As Horowitz r ecogn i sed ,  t h i s  p rocess  of :  r e p a i r i n g  broken down 
d e f i n i t i o n s  occu r s  i n  p o l i t i c a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o o ,  b u t r f r o m  t h a t  s p h e r e  it is  ~ 
recognised  a s  a  normal f a c t  of l i f e .  Furthermore,  i n  t h a t  - sphe re  
arrangements e x i s t  t o  a l l o w  a reasonably  f l e x i b l e  and wide s o c i a l  
n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  normative d e f i n i t i o n s  and t h e  s o c i a l  v a l u e s  which they  
embody. The j u d i c i a r y ' s  mode o f  c o n c e p t u a l i s i n g  and judging i s s u e s  proposes  
o the rwi se .  R e a l i t y  can ,  i t  b e l i e v e s ,  be  p r e c i s e l y  and f a c t u a l l y  desc r ibed ,  
and can  t h e r e f o r e  be  c o ~ p r e h e n d e d  by d e f i n i t i o n s  and r u l e s  which a r e  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  p r e c i s e .  I f  they  a r e  f a l s i f i e d  it  is n o t  because r e a l i t y  is  
i n h e r e n t l y  m u l t i p l e x ,  and sometimes beyond s i n g l e  p r e c i s e  fo rmula t ion ,  b u t  
because t h e  concepts  need f u r t h e r  e l a b o r a t i o n  and p r e c i s i o n .  The t a s k  o f  
lawyers and o t h e r  e x p e r t s ,  is  t o  r e v e a l  o b j e c t i v e l y  t r u e  meanings n o t  t o  
n e g o t i a t e  o r  encourage t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  of  them. Hence t h i s  mode is  a l s o  
i n h e r e n t l y  a n t i p a t h e t i c  t o  wider  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
I11 Mediation o r  D e c l a r a t i o n  a s  s t y l e s  of knowledge 
One d i s t i n c t i o n  which has been drawn around the proces s  o f  judgement 
is i t s  b a s i c  d i f f e r e n c e  from a more m e d i a t i v e  decis ion-making process .  Most 
c o m e n t  has  a t t a c h e d  to  what has  been regarded  a s  t h e  e x t r a v a g a n t l y  adversary  
n a t u r e  of j u d i c i a l  p roceedings ,  which a s  one au tho r  t y p i c a l l y  lamented 
' on ly  hardens t he  b e l l i c o s e  a r t e r i e s  of t h e  c o n t e s t a n t s 1  i n  a  g l a d a t o r i a l  
combat (45). Less a t t e n t i o n  has been g iven  t o  t h e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n ,  ex-ca thedra  
n a t u r e  of j u d i c i a l  ways of r e s o l v i n g  con£ l i c t s .  ~ n t h r o p o l o g i s  ts such  a s  
Gluckman and Eckhoff ,  f o r  example(46),  have noted  t h a t  i n  r e l a t i v e l y  
u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  s o ~ i e t i ~ s ,  where l e g a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ( l i k e  p ro fe s s iona l i sm 
and s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  i n  gene ra l )  have n o t  c l e a r l y  s p l i t  themselves  o f f  from 
o t h e r  s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and r o l e s ,  t h e  c o u r t s  f r e q u e n t l y  have t o  a c t  mre 
a s  media tors  and c o n c i l i a t o r s  between c o n f l i c t i n g  p a r t i e s ,  r a t h e r  than  a s  
ex-ca thedra  d e c l a r e r s  o f  t h e  law. There i s  a l s o  less s t r u c t u r a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t o  f e n c e  i s s u e s  o f f  i n t o  conf ined  q u e s t i o n s ,  s e p a r a t e d  from t h e i r  r e l a t e d  
h i s t o r i c a l  and wider  s o c i a l  q u e s t i o n s ,  so t h a t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  a  c a s e  may 
f r e q u e n t l y  i nvo lve ,  s a y ,  t h e  examinat ion of  d i s t a n t  s o c i a l  o r  h i s t o r i c a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  e t c . ,  which would look u t t e r l y  i r r e l e v a n t  from t h e  a h i s t o r i c a l ,  
i n s u l a t e d  p e r s p e c t i v e  of  o u r  c o u r t s .  Because t h e  i s s u e s  a r e  more i n t e g r a t e d  
i n t o  t h e  everyday s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  world,  b a r g a i n i n g ,  n e g o t i a t i o n  and 
compromise become neces sa ry  and accepted  p a r t s  o f  t h e  process .  Au tho r i t y  
IS n o t  t o  be found i n  a  r i t u a l i s t i c a l l y  ydef ended, a r t i f i c i a l  o b j e c t i v i t y  
and d i s t a n c e  from s o c i a l  a f f a i r s  a s  is t h e  c a s e  f o r  o u r  j u d i c i a r y .  As 
noted e a r l i e r ,  a  c e n t r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  j u d i c i a l  e t h o s  i n  o u r  s o c i e t y  i s  i t s  
supposed c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  smutty ba rga in ing  and compromis i ng  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
process .  
I t  is  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  developments i n  advanced s o c i e t i e s  and p r i m i t i v e  
s o c i e t i e s  seem perhaps t o  b e  go ing  i n  o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n s .  Thus some a u t h o r s ,  
have n o t i c e d  t h a t  a s  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and p r o f e s s i o n a l  s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  o f  
l e g a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  deve lops  i n  p r i m i t i v e  s o c i e t i e s ,  s o  t h e  s t y l e  o f  
j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n  changes away from med ia t i on  and more towards a b s o l u t i s t  
d e c l a r a t i o n  w i t h  which w e  a r e  f a m i l i a r ( 4 7 ) .  A t  t h e  same t ime,  i n  t h e  
advanced s o c i e t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  America, i t  has been no ted  t h a t  a s  t h e  
c o u r t s  have p layed  an i n c r e a s i n g l y  accepted  and a g g r e s s i v e  r o l e  i n  s o c i a l  
policymaking v i a  broadened l i t i g a t i o n  .proceedings,  t hey  have begun t o  
develop some l i m i t e d  means of  tempering t h e  d e c l a r a t o r y  s t y l e  w i th  in formal  
n e g o t i a t i o n  and compromis e between p a r  t ies (48). Whether t h i s  i s  a  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  method of  democra t ic  l e g i s l a t i o n  remains i n  doubt ,  b u t  i t  is  
i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  a  changing s o c i a l  r o l e  shou ld  be  f o r c i n g  a  cor responding  
c o g n i t i v e  and p r a c t i c a l )  change i n  t h e  way i n  which the' j u d i c i a r y  d e f i n e s  
and r e s o l v e s  i s s u e s .  Such j u d i c i a l  policymaking is f a r  l e s s  openly  p r a c t i s e d  
i n  B r i t a i n ,  f o r  r ea sons  o u t l i n e d  i n  Chapter  4. Windscale was an except ion  
i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  and any p o ~ s i b l e ' m e d i ~ t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  which was a rguably  
r equ i r ed  by the  broad p o l i t i c a l  n a t u r e  o f  t he  i s sue . .  was ve ry  s t r o n g l y  
suppressed by t h e  a b s o l u t i s t ,  d e c l a r a t o r y  s t y l e  o; the  j u d i c i a r y .  
One u s e f u l  way of  looking a t  t h e ' p o l i t i c a l  natui:e o f  t h e  j u d i c i a l  
s t y l e  of c o n f l i c t  r e s o l u t i o n  is sugges ted  aga in  by ani:hropological work. 
Bohannan has  argued t h a t  a media t ive  s t y l e  i s  necessary  where t h e  power 
system is m u l t i ~ e n t r i c ( ~ ~ ) .  P o l i t i c a l  p rocesses ,  f o r  rxample, u s u a l l y  
r ecogn i se  m u l t i p l e  c e n t r e s ,  and they a r e  accord ingly  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by 
n e g o t i a t i o n  and compromise, and a  c o n t i n u a l  opevness t o  f u r t h e r  barga in ing .  
J u d i c i a l  p roces se s  on the  o t h e r  hand, imply a  u n i c e n t r i c  power s t r u c t u r e ,  
they  a s s e r t  a  s i n g l e  a u t h o r i t y ,  one  which is  r e i n f o r c e d  by t h e  o b j e c t i v i t y  
myths t h a t  a r e  c u l t i v a t e d  i n  j u d i c i a l  c i r c l e s .  This  m n o p o l i s t i c  
a u t h o r i t y  is  p o s s i b l e  when an i s s u e  i s  s e v e r e l y  reduced and s e p a r a t e d  
from p o l i t i c s  and s o c i e t y  a t  l a r g e  a s  a r e  most c o u r t  c a s e s ,  b u t  it  becomes 
more p rob lema t i c  a s  t h e  i s s u e  becoxes more obv ious ly  one w i t h  a  broader  
s o c i a l  o r  p o l i t i c a l  dimension t o  it. 
Bohannan o f f e r s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  analogy when-he . d i s c u s s e s  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  p l u r a l i s m  i n  which l e g a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  have ope ra t ed .  The f i r s t  type  i nvo lves  s t a t e l e s s  s o c i e t i e s ,  
which e x h i b i t  t he  med ia t i ve ,  compromising s t y l e  of con£ l i c t  r e s o l u t i o n  
desc r ibed  e a r l i e r .  The second type  of p l u r a l i s m ,  however, i nvo lves  t h a t  
of c o l o n i a l i s m ,  where c o l o n i a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  has  meant t h e  a t tempted  
subord ina t ion  of  a l i e n  c u l t u r e s  and v a l u e s  ( i nc lud ing  t h e i r  own p ro to - l ega l  
system of t h e  c o l o n i s e r  u s u a l l y  imported w i th  l i t t l e  a d a p t a t i o n  from t h e  
c o l o n i s e r  coun t ry .  In t h i s  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  t h e  c o l o n i a l  law sys tem does n o t  
r ecogn i se  t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o r  l eg i t imacy  of  t h e  co lony ' s  t r a d i t i o n a l  c u l t u r e ,  
and a t tempts  t o  o p e r a t e  i n s t e a d  i n  t h e  u sua l  d e c l a r a t o r y  mode. To t h e  
( o f t e n  l a r g e )  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  c u l t u r e  has  r e s i l i e n c e  i n  t h e  
f a c e  of c o l o n i a l  s u p r e s s i o n ,  and to  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e s e  c u l t u r a l  v a l u e s  
c l a s h  w i th  t hose  of t h e  c o l o n i a l  power, t hen  a  p l u r a l i s t i c  power system 
p r e v a i l s ,  y e t  is  n o t  recognised  a s  such by t h e  p a r t y  w i t h  g r e a t e r  formal  
power. 
This  could  be a  f a i r  model of t h e  r e c e n t l y  emerged s t r u c t u r e  o f  
decision-making i n  t h e  n u c l e a r  deba te .  U n t i l  t h e  1 9 7 0 ~ ~  t h e r e  was v i r t u a l l y  
p r i v a t e  decis ion-making,  and no v i s i b l e  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  r e c o g n i s e  a s  an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  c e n t r e  of power. R e l a t i v e l y  v e r y  r a p i d l y  an o p p o s i t i o n  has 
developed, w i t h  s u b s t a n t i a l  p o l i t i c a l  d r i v e .  Its i n ~ p i ~ r a t i o n ,  though o f t e n  
obscure ,  and by no means uniform, is  l a r g e l y  based upon d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  
I 
va lues  from t h o s e  i n  a u t h o r i t y .  As a  r e s u l t  of y e a r s  of freedom from any 
such o p p o s i t i o n ,  i . e .  used t o  a  s t r o n g l y  u n i c e n t r i c  form of  p w e r ,  and 
r e l u c t a n t  f o r  obvious reasons  t o  r ecogn i se  a  competing c e n t r e  o f  power, 
t he  powers t h a t  be more o r  l e s s  au toma t i ca l l y  r e s o r t  i n  a  c r i s i s  such a s  
t h a t  deve loping  i n  l a t e  1970 o v e r  THORP, t o  an i n a d v e r t e n t l y  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
u n i c e n t r i c  s t y l e  of  decision-making. Whether t h i s  mode i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  
depends upon whether  one  b e l i e v e s  t he  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  be l e g i t i m a t e  (which is a  
d i f f e r e n t  q u e s t i o n  from t h a t  of whether i t s  c a s e  should  be heeded). 
The s o c i a l  psychology of c e r t a i n t y  
, 
Perhaps t h e  most impor tan t  f e a t u r e  of j u d i c i a l  reasoning  r e l a t e s  q u i t e  
f l o s e l y  t o  t h e  hahi t of  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  t o  p r e c i s e  'causal  f a c t u a l  ques t i ons ,  
rlamely t h e  q u e s t  f o r  c e r t a i n t y .  As t h e  Engl i sh  judge, Lord J e s s e l ,  remarked : 
' I  may sometimes be wrong, b u t  I am never  u n c e r t a i n 1  (50) . As Morrison has 
expressed t h e  g e n e r a l  view, t h e  B r i t i s h  l e g a l  p rocess  e s p e c i a l l y  o p e r a t e s  
a s  i f  ' t h e r e  is a  s i n g l e ,  r i g h t  answer to  a  p a r t i c u l a r  q u e s t i o n 1  ("), and 
t h a t  ' i n  any d i s p u t e  one  s i d e  i s  r i g h t  and t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  is  wrong1 ( 5 2 )  
I n  o r d e r  t o  s e c u r e  a u t h o r i t y ,  a  d e c i s i o n  must e i t h e r  b e  based upon 
t h e  supposed i n £  a l l i b i l i  t y  of t he  decision-maker , o r  appear  a s  untouched 
by human c h o i c e ,  o n l y  r evea l ed  a s  an independent  t r u t h .  As Eckoff has  noted,  
i n £  a l l i b i l i t y  is  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s u s t a i n  i n  t h e  modern world : 
'To m a i n t a i n  a  b e l i e f  t h a t  c e r t a i n  persons  a r e  i n f a l l i b l e  can ,  
n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  p r e s e n t  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  c u l t u r e s  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by democra t i s a t i on  and s e c u l a r i s a t i o n .  To reduce  
o r  concea l  t h e  human f a c t o r  i n  decision-making w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  o f t e n  
be b e t t e r  s u i t e d  t o  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  con£ idence  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n s .  
L e t t i n g  t h e  judge appear  a s  Ithe mouthpiece of  t h e  law',  who cannot  
h imse l f  e x e r t  any i n £  luence m r t h  mentioning o n  t h e  outcome o f  t h e  
c a s e s ,  t ends  t o  remove the  f e a r  t h a t  h i s  own i n t e r e s t s ,  p r e j u d i c e s ,  
sympathies  and a n t i p a t h i e s  may have impact on h i s  r u l i n g s  ... 
Many techniques have been used i n  t he  v a r i o u s  j u d i c i a l  systems f o r  
t h e  purpose of e l i m i n a t i n g ,  reducing pr concea l ing  the  i n f l u e n c e  of 
t he  judge . . . / - f o r  example' 7 . .. the: t echnique  of j u d i c i a l  
- - a, 
argumentat ion which g i v e s  t he  d e c i s i o n s  t h e  appearance of being t h e  
products  of knowledge and l o g i c ,  and n o t  o f  e v a l u a t i o n  and choice.  I (53) 
%. 
It appears  t o  be p r e c i s e l y  when judges a r e  caught  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  of c o n f l i c t  
t h a t  they  most a r d e n t l y  r e s o r t  t o  t h e  s h e l t e r  of f o m a l ,  o b j e c t i f i e d  r u l e s  
i nc lud ing  those  of l o g i c ,  i.e. t o  ' v e r b a l l y  formula ted  r u l e s  which seek  to  
d i s g u i s e  and t o  m i h i m i s e  t he  need f o r  cho ice1  (54). This  h a b i t  is  fol lowed 
when t h e  j u d i c i a l  f r a m e w r k  i s  employed i n  i n q u i r i e s  and' c o m i s s i o n s  o u t s i d e  
normal c o u r t  c a se s .  
I V  Conclusions - r i t u a l s  of  a u t h o r i t y  
I m u l d  l i k e  to- i n t r o d u c e  t h i s  f i n a l  s e c t i o n  w i t h ' a n  anecdote  which 
seems to  r a i s e  some of t h e  c e n t r a l  problems. Whilst v i s i t i n g  Corne l l  
U n i v e r s i t y  r e c e n t l y  I r ead  a  p r e s s  r e p o r t  of t h e  Cour t  o f  Appeal v e r d i c t  
of t h e  D i s t r i c t  of Columbia C i r c u i t ,  t h a t  Environmental Impact S ta tements  
submi t ted  by t h e  proposed deve loper  under  t h e  Na tu ra l  Environmental 
P r o t e c t i o n  Act f o r  n u c l e a r  power p l a n t  l i c e n s i n g  h e a r i n g s  m u l d  i n  f u t u r e  
be ob l iged  t o  c o n s i d e r  and even q u a n t i f y  p o t e n t i a l  p sycho log ica l  damage to 
r e s i d e n t s  n e a r  such p l a n t s .  This  was o f  cou r se  a  consequence of t h e  g r e a t  
f u s s  fo l l owing  t h e  Three M i l e  I s l a n d  a c c i d e n t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  
and f e a r  gene ra t ed  by p u b l i c  c o n f l i c t  and chaos amongst t hose  supposedly  
i n  charge  of t h e  emergency. A  new f i e l d  of law - "psychoenvironmental l a d '  
- was s a i d  t o  have been c r e a t e d .  
Having thought  and w r i t t e n  q u i t e  a  l o t  about  t h e  e m p i r i c i s t  extremism 
of t h e  j u d i c i a r y ,  I immediately took t h i s  t o  be  a  supreme example of t h a t  
extremism - a s  i f  p sycho log ica l  damage w e r e  an o b j e c t i v e  e n t i t y  "out there"  
i n  t h e  environment which could  be  demarcated and measured wi thou t  having to 
make g r o s s l y  c o n t e s t a b l e  assumptions t h a t  m u l d  f a t a l l y  f l a w  any remote 
semblance of  o b j e c t i v i t y  . Like prev ious  i n t r o d u c t i o n s  o f  psycho logy ,  it  
seemed t o  be a  r e c i p e  f o r  end le s s  c o n f l i c t  and incoherence.  I t  a l s o  appeared 
t o  me t o  be empir ic ism taken  t o  a b s u r d l y u n r e a l i s t i c  l e n g t h s ,  and I observed 
t o  f r i e n d s  ( a l s o  c o l l e a g u e s  i n  t h i s  f i e l d )  t h a t  i f  a  judge could  s e r i o u s l y  
make such d e c l a r a t i o n s  i t  only  ind ica t ed  t h e  f a n t a s t i c  s o c i a l  i n s u l a t i o n  
of the  j u d i c i a r y ,  and t h e  exaggerated i n c u l c a t i o n  of  t h e  e m p i r i c i s t  f i c t i o n .  
Being more f a m i l i a r  w i th  US j u d i c i a l  a f f a i r s ,  however, t h e i r  r e f l e x  
r e a c t i o n  was q u i t e  t h e  o p p o s i t e ,  t h a t  t h e  judge concerned was r o u t i n e l y  
e x e r c i s i n g  h i s  own p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  i n  p l a c i n g  y e t  another  burden on 
. 
the n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y  and t h e  regulatory-cum-promoting a u t h o r i t i e s .  Whilst 
;I was aware t h a t  j u d i c i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  laws, r u l e s ,  and precedents  
is tantamount t o  p o l i t i c a l  i n f luence ,  and t h a t  t h e  US j u d i c i a r y  p lays  a  
f a r  more prominent and e x p l i c i t  r o l e  i n  t h i s  r ega rd  than  s a y  t h a t  of  t h e  
UK, I was n e v e r t h e l e s s  taken aback a t  t h e  au tomat ic  way i n  which t h i s  
important  j u d i c i a l  a c t i o n  was taken t o  be  d e l i b e r a t e l y  p o l i t i c a l ,  y e t  
qu i  t e  unremarkable. 
I n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  ca se ,  the  e m p i r i c i s t  framework of j u d i c i a l  
reasoning  caused e x t r a  o b s t r u c t i o n s  t o  t h e  n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y .  I n  t he  c a s e  
which I had s t u d i e d  i n  d e t a i l ,  t h a t  of t he  Windscale I n q u i r y ' s  a d j u d i c a t i o n  
of environmental  r i s k s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  a  new type  o f  n u c l e a r  . f u e l  
reprocess ing ,  i d e n t i c a l  e m p i r i c i s t  -assumptions by t h e .  Judge had l e d  i n  
t h e  o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n ,  to quash opponents '  arguments by m i s i n t e r p r e t i n g  
th& then  showing t h e  m i s i n t e r p r e t e d  a s s e r t i o n s  t o  be e m p i r i c a l l y  unfounded. 
Although it  w u l d  be easy  t o  s e e  t h i s  too a s  d e l i b e r a t e  b u t  c o v e r t  p o l i t i c a l  
manipula t ion ,  t h i s  t ime by a  pro-nuclear  judge, I had,  perhaps n a i v e l y ,  
p r e f e r r e d  t o  begin  by assuming good f a i t h  a l l  round, and see where t h a t  
would lead  A t t r i b u t i o n  of a  s i n c e r e l y  h e l d  b u t  extreme and u n r e a l i s t i c  t 0 
empiricisrn/Jus r i c e  Parker  seemed e n t i r e l y  d e f e n s i b l e  f  corn c l o s e  examination 
of h i s  u t t e r a n c e s  throughout  t he  Inqu i ry  and from wide reading  i n  t h e  
l i t e r a t u r e  about  l e g a l  reasoning  gene ra l ly .  
For t h e  p r e s e n t  d i s c u s s i o n ,  however, the p o i n t  of  r e l a t i n g  these  
exper iences  is t h a t  they r a i s e  important  q u e s t i o n s  about  t r u t h ,  f a l s ehood  
and a u t h o r i t y  which p a r a l l e l  s i m i l a r  q u e s t i o n s  debated i n  t h e  soc io logy  
and philosophy of s c i ence .  Furthermore t h e  j u d i c i a l  c a s e s  i n  which I have 
taken an i n t e r e s t  have involved c o n f l i c t  between e x p e r t s ,  and corresponding 
p r e s s u r e  upon t h e  j u d i c i a l  p rocess  t o  r e s o l v e  t h a t  c o n f l i c t  i n  o r d e r  t o  
be a b l e  t o  pronounce an a u t h o r i t a t i v e  s o c i a l  v e r d i c t .  The q u e s t i o n  is  
whether we should view such e x p l i c i t  j u d i c i a l  r ea son ing  a s  a  k ind  of 
r h e t o r i c  concea l ing  s o c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  which have been d e l i b e r a t e l y  exe rc i sed  
i n  *&ing the  d e c i s i o n  ( o r ,  t o  p u t  i t  ;).nother way, i n  c r e a t i n g  p u b l i c  
knowledge i n  t h i s  s'phere) o r  whether we should view t h i s  empir i ' c i s t  language 
as a n a t u r a l ,  mechanical r e f l e c t i o n  of a c e r t a i n  k ind  of  s o c i a l i s a t i o n ,  
s o c i a l  p o s i t i o n  and experience ? (The f u r t h e r '  qu&t ion  i s -  - does :is hake 
any d i f f e r e n c e  how w e  view i t ,  i f  t he  consequences a r e  i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  ? 
I am tempted to  b e l i e v e  - tha t  ' t h e  key concepts  he re ,  of "de l ibe ra t e ly"  and 
"mechanical", a r e  . too vague t o  be 'able to '  s u p p o r t  ' such '  a c l e a n  'dichotomy, 
and t h a t  un le s s  one wants t o  pass  moral judgement on  judges, i t  does n o t  
ma t t e r  anyway. ) 
I t  i s  c l e a r ,  however, t h a t  law holds  a view of s c i e n c e  which j u s t i f i e s  
i t s  own c o n t r o l  of s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge i n  l e g a l  and q u a s i  l e g a l  s e t t i n g s  
- sc i ence  i s  u l t i m a t e l y  mono l i th i ca l ly  r a t i o n a l ,  e m p i r i c a l l y  c o n t r o l l e d ,  
and exposes s i n g u l a r  n a t u r a l  t r u t h s .  But s c i e n t i s t s  themselves cannot  
manage t o  produce t h e s e  r e s u l t s  i n  s o c i a l l y  r e l e v a n t  i s s u e s ,  so  t h a t  l e g a l  
p r e c i s i o n  and d i s c i p l i n e  i s  needed i n  o r d e r  to  d i scove r  them. A t  t h e  wst 
pragmatic leve l - ,  law can 'contro 1 ,and manipulare s cLence to' produce apparent  
coherence. Natura l  law can be i n t e r p r e t e d  to cor respond wi th  whatever 
f u r t h e r  law t h e  j u d i c i a l  system may be disposed t o  1discover ' .  
Yet t h e r e  appears  to  be a cur ious  and d i f f i c u l t  c i r c u l a r i t y  t h a t  
r e f l e c t s  b a s i c  problems i n  t h e  c u l t i v a t i o n  of l e g i t i m a t e  s o c i a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  i n  a reas  invo lv ing  e s o t e r i c  e x p e r t i s e .  The t r a d i t i o n a l  B r i t i s h .  
system of policy-making i n  such a reas  has  been the  e x p e r t  advisory  cormnittee, 
s e l e c t e d  by p r i v a t e  means, d e l i b e r a t i n g  i n  p r i v a t e  and i s s u i n g  consensual  
conclus ions ,  backed by a l l  the  r i t u a l  a u t h o r i t y  of t h e  s t a t e  appara tus  
and of t he  s c i e n t i f i c  es tab l i shment .  More r e c e n t l y ,  channels  of  c r i t i c i s m ,  
so -ca l l ed  " c r i t i c a l  science", have emerged to  cha l l enge  i n  p u b l i c  t h e  
a u t h o r i t y  of  such committees; t h e i r  success  has been based o f t e n  upon t h e  
s imple c la im to  uphold t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  s c i e n t i f i c  v i r t u e s  of open information,  
f r e e  mutual c r i t i c i s m  and deba te  between equals  (55) . Unused to such  
s t r i c t u r e s ,  t h e  entrenched o f f i c i a l  c o r n i t t e e s  have sometimes undermined 
t h e i r  own a u t h o r i t y  by p a t r o n i s i n g  o r  r i d i c u l i n g  cr i t ics  b e f o r e  examining 
t h e i r  arguments p rope r ly ,  by r e f u s i n g  to d ivu lge  informat ion  f u l l y ,  and 
( 5  6) g e n e r a l l y  t r a n s g r e s s i n g  t h e  supposed norms o f  s c i e n c e  and r a t i o n a l  deba te  . 
I n  a word, s c i e n c e  has  begun i n  a sense  to s e c u l a r i s e  i t s e l f  a s  i t s  own 
image i s  now t h e  r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t  under ly ing  t h e  crumbling c r e d i b i l i t y  of 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  s c i e n t i f i c  e x p e r t i s e .  W i t h  t h e  t rembling of t h i s  
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